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INTRODUCTION
Indigenous, traditional, and local resource-based peoples and com-
munities' have long used intimate knowledge of their surroundings and
resources to shape ecosystems, to provide food, medicines, and other
useful products, and to breed better crops and livestock. This knowledge
has not been recognized as being either "scientific" or valuable to the
dominant culture and so has been freely appropriated by others.
The appropriation of the scientific and technical knowledge of
indigenous and local peoples, of the products of that knowledge, and
even of the genetic characteristics of the people themselves has become
both notorious and contested. It forms the heart of current debates about
conservation of biological diversity,2 indigenous rights,3 and genetic
resources in agriculture.4 In multiple fora, indigenous and local commu-
nities are at last finding their own voice on the issue, claiming the right
to control access to their knowledge and resources and so put an end to
appropriation.
This article recasts the debates over access to, and control over,
genetic and biological knowledge and resources in terms of the appro-
priation of indigenous and local communities' knowledge and resources.
It first discusses recent examples of appropriation as currently conducted
by global biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and agribusiness corporations
1. The definitions of indigenous, traditional, and local communities are problematic.
Indigenous or tribal peoples, according to one definition, are "those who share customs and
local knowledge of specific geographic territory and are relatively independent of, or have
little contact with, the dominant national society of the country in which they live." EDITH
BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON
PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 264 (1990). Traditional peoples "encompass
many of the rural and peasant communities that inhabit the countryside . . . [and] live on
marginal lands relatively removed from many of the accoutrements of modem life." Id. at
265. Many traditional peoples are also indigenous and vice versa. While there are numerous
differences between these types of communities, for my purposes both have suffered the
appropriation of their knowledge and resources and both are stewards of much knowledge of
ecosystems, genetic resources, and the natural world. Local communities are much less well-
defined. See discussion infra Part III. Nonetheless, the usage in treaties and elsewhere refers
to "indigenous and local" communities together, and so I have chosen to reproduce that usage
here.
2. See discussion of the Convention on Biological Diversity infra notes 48-50.
3. See discussion of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and of the
International Labour Organisation Convention 169 infra notes 171-73.
4. See discussion of the Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) International
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. In addi-
tion, the Fourth International Technical Conference on Plant Genetic Resources, held in
Leipzig, Germany from June 17 to June 23, 1996, approved a Global Plan of Action on Plant
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture infra note 209. The FAO is also planning a
World Food Summit in November 1996 at which these issues will figure prominently.
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and their associates in Northern5 universities, seed and gene banks, and
research centers. Second, it describes and exposes the mechanisms of
appropriation by focusing on the limited and culturally determined
definitions of what is "wild" as opposed to "cultivated," what is "knowl-
edge" and who can possess it, and what are "innovations" and "inven-
tions." Included in this discussion is an examination of how the "com-
mon heritage" principle fosters appropriation through its application in
seed banks, gene banks, and other ex situ forms of conservation of
genetic material.
Third, the article analyzes briefly three possible frameworks for
ending appropriation: broadened and redefined intellectual property
regimes, private contracts between communities or States and "bio-
prospectors," and expansion of the concept of "farmers' rights" to
provide both compensation and control to indigenous and local commu-
nities. Each framework raises the essential problem of defining the
holders of the right to patent, sell, or protect the scientific and technical
knowledge at issue. Possible holders include individual inventors or
breeders, the State where the resource is located, and the indigenous or
local community that has protected, developed, and used the resource
through the years. Any solution to the issues of cultural appropriation in
this area will require profound rethinking of how we define, empower,
and protect indigenous and local communities and their historical knowl-
edge base.
I. THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE OF
INDIGENOUS AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES
Indigenous and local communities have a long history of using
plants for almost all needs, including food, shelter, clothing, and medi-
cine. Common remedies used today were often first developed by heal-
ers prior to contact with industrial societies. Yet, although many of
today's drugs and cosmetics originated from the stewardship and knowl-
edge of indigenous and local communities, that knowledge remains
unrecognized and unvalued until appropriated from those communities
by Western 6 corporations or institutions. To cite a few examples:
- The well-known cure for malaria, quinine, comes from the
bark of the Peruvian cinchona tree.7 Andean indigenous
5. "Northern" and "Southern" refer respectively to the industrialized but gene-poor
countries, often called "developed," and the gene-rich but nonindustrialized countries, often
called "developing."
6. "Western" refers to colonial or post-colonial industrial societies in their relation to
indigenous, traditional, and local communities.
7. Catherine Farley & Daphne Field, Healing Plants, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 8, 1995, at BI.
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groups used quinine as a cure for fevers, supposedly learn-
ing of the bark's powers while observing feverish jaguars
eating it.8
- The rosy periwinkle plant, unique to Madagascar, has been
found to contain properties that combat certain cancers. 9 The
anti-cancer drugs vincristine and vinblastine have been
developed from the periwinkle, resulting in $100 million in
annual sales for Eli Lilly and virtually nothing for Madagas-
car.'
0
- For thousands of years, indigenous farmers in India have
used the leaves and seeds of the neem tree as a natural
insecticide." Juice from the tree has also been used to pre-
vent scabies and other skin disorders.' 2 Villagers still scrub
their teeth with neem twigs. 3
Several patents have now been granted in the United
States and other industrialized countries for products based
on the neem plant. 14 The U.S.-based multinational corpora-
tion, W.R. Grace, which received a patent for an insecticide
based on the active ingredient in neem, has stated that it
does not plan to compensate anyone in India for providing
the knowledge that underlies its neem-based product. 5 Cor-
porate Vice-President Martin B. Sherwin has dismissed the
Indian people's discovery and development of the plant's
uses as "folk medicine."'
16
8. Id.
9. Elizabeth Pennisi, Hairy Harvest: Bacteria Turn Roots into Chemical Factories, 141
SCIENCE NEWS 366 (1992).
10. Shayana Kadidal, Plants, Poverty, and Pharmaceutical Patents, 103 YALE L.J. 223,
224 (1993) (citing Diane Jukofsky, Medicinal Plant Research Leads Scientists to Rain
Forests, DRUG Topics, Apr. 22, 1991, at 26).
11. Sandy Tolan, Against the Grain: Multinational Corporations Peddling Patented
Seeds and Chemical Pesticides Are Poised to Revolutionize India's Ancient Agricultural
System. But At What Cost?, L.A. TIMES MAG., July 10, 1994, at 18, 20.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Gurdial Singh Nijar, A Conceptual Framework and Essential Elements of a Rights
Regime for the Protection of Indigenous Rights and Biodiversity, BIODIVERSITY CONVENTION
BRIEFINGS (Third World Network, Penang, Malaysia), 1994, at 4.
15. Tolan, supra note 11, at 20.
16. Id.
[Vol. 17:919
Of Seeds and Shamans
- The endod berry, a member of the soapwort family, has
been used for centuries in Ethiopia as a laundry soap and
fish intoxicant. 17 Scientists noticed that there were fewer
aquatic snails where people used endod berries to wash
clothes; just a few pounds of berries easily controlled whole
colonies of snails. 8 Endod has also been used medicinally
by tropical indigenous groups to treat schistosomiasis, a
potentially fatal parasitic disease transmitted by aquatic
snails. 19 A patent for endod's crustacean-killing properties
has been granted to the University of Toledo after a scant
few months of testing.20 An endod derivative may help stop
the zebra mussel invasion in the Great Lakes, an environ-
mental disaster that has crippled water supplies' and threat-
ened marine ecosystems." Neither Ethiopia nor the local
people who first identified endod's many beneficial uses and
then protected the endod plant through the years will receive
any of the expected financial rewards.
- The University of California and Lucky Biotech, a Japanese
corporation, were recently granted a patent for the sweetening
proteins naturally derived from two African plants, katempfe
and the serendipity berry.' These plants have long been used
by African peoples for their sweetening properties.
23
Thaumatin, the substance that makes katempfe sweet, is
2,000 times sweeter than sugar yet calorie-free. 24 Although
any transgenic plant containing the derived sweetening
proteins would be covered by the patent, no arrangements
17. Endod: A Case Study of the Use of African Indigenous Knowledge to Address Global
Health and Environmental Problems, RAFI COMMUNIQUE (Rural Advancement Found. Int'l,
Ottawa, Ont.), Mar. 1993 [hereinafter Endod].
18. Linda Yang, Garden Q&A, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at C13.
19. Uinsionn Mac Dubhghaill, Now No Life Form Is Safe From the Patent Lawyer, IRISH
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1993, at 4.
20. Endod, supra note 17, at 3.
21. See id at 3; Rural Advancement Foundation International, [hereinafter RAFI]
Conserving Indigenous Knowledge: Integrating Two Systems of Innovation 8 (Sept. 1, 1994)
(unpublished study on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law) [hereinafter
Conserving Indigenous Knowledge].
22. See Conserving Indigenous Knowledge, supra note 21, at 8.
23. Intellectual Property Rights for Whom?, GRAIN BIOBRIEFING (Genetic Resources
Action International, Barcelona, Spain), Part 2, June 1994, at 5.
24. Id
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have been made to return part of the benefits to the African
communities.25
- A barley gene that confers resistance to the yellow-dwarf
virus is the product of centuries of breeding and cultivation
by Ethiopian farmers. 26 U.S. farmers and the scientists who
patented this barley variety receive substantial profits from its
current cultivation in the U.S., but the Ethiopian farming
communities that originally developed the variety receive
nothing.27
- In 1990, scientist Sally Fox of California received a U.S.
patent for colored cotton.2' This patent is economically
significant because multinational corporations, such as Levi
Strauss and Esprit, want environmentally friendly materials
like naturally colored cotton for their clothes .29 Unfortunately,
credit for the "invention" of colored cotton does not go to its
true developers. The seed for Sally Fox's patented cotton
came from a United States Department of Agriculture collec-
tion obtained by Dr. Gus Hyer during his travels in Latin
America.30 Colored cotton resulted from centuries of breeding
and cultivation by Latin American indigenous groups. 3' Even
now, 15,000 indigenous farmers grow colored cotton, and
over 50,000 indigenous women still spin and weave it.
32
Fox's patent directs all profits to her, not these indigenous
inventors and cultivators.33
- A Western scientist returned from West Africa with some
cowpeas from a seed bank called the Institute of Tropical
Agriculture (ITA).34 The seed bank, in turn, had obtained the
25. Id.
26. Elizabeth Bryant, Corporate Patents or Global Piracy? Africans Oppose Privatization
of Genetic Innovations, AFRICAN FARMER, Apr. 1994, at 37.
27. Id.
28. Martin Teitel, Selling Cells: The Thriving Business of Patenting Life, DOLLARS AND





33. Id.; see also Conserving Indigenous Knowledge, supra note 21, at 9.
34. Hungoo, Arrogance, and the "Gene" Revolution, RAFI SPECIAL REPORT (Rural
Advancement Found. Int'l, Ottawa, Ont.), 1989, at 4-5.
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seeds from local farming communities.35 Within a decade, the
scientist had isolated a specific gene resistant to insect pests
which could be inserted into other crops such as soybean and
maize.36 This gene was patented with no credit or royalties
given to the ITA or others who had helped develop and pre-
serve the cowpea variety.37
- In 1990, the University of Florida patented a Brazilian fungus
known to be lethal to a species of fire ant that damages crops
in the United States. Brazilian farmers were aware that
something in their soil killed the ants, but the patent applica-
tion did not mention the Brazilian origin of the fungus, much
less include provisions for compensating the Brazilian farm-
ers who first noticed and made use of the connection.38
- There have been a number of attempts to patent human cell
lines of indigenous people without their knowledge or con-
sent. In one notorious episode, the U.S. government in 1993
applied for U.S. and world patents on the cell line of a
Guaymi Indian woman from Panama.39 After international
protests from the Guaymi General Congress and others, the
U.S. government withdrew its claim.' Despite this experi-
ence, in 1995 the U.S. Patent Office granted a patent to the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) on the T-cell line of a
Papua New Guinean and two people from the Solomon
Islands.4 The patent applications indicate that the cell lines
may be useful in combating a virus associated with adult




38. Conserving Indigenous Knowledge, supra note 21, at 23. While the communities'
healers may not have known the scientific name of the medicinal soil component, they knew
of its medicinal qualities. Id. For a summary of instances of appropriation of microbial material
from indigenous communities by transnational pharmaceutical corporations, see id.
39. The Patenting of Human Genetic Material, RAFI COMMUNIQUE (Rural Advancement
Found. Int'l, Ottawa, Ont.), Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 7.
40. Id. at 8.
41. Id. at 8-9.
42. Id. The patent, U.S. 5,397,696, was granted to NIH on March 14, 1995. New Questions
About Management and Exchange of Human Tissues at NIH: Indigenous Person's Cells
Patented, RAFI COMMUNIQUE (Rural Advancement Found. Int'l, Ottawa, Ont.), Mar.-Apr.
1996, at 2. After RAFI and other nongovernmental organizatoins (NGOs) protested, NIH-related
researchers insisted they had obtained the consent of the tribe and had agreed to share royalties
Summer 1996]
Michigan Journal of International Law
what degree the people whose DNA has been sampled are
aware of the potentially lucrative nature of the research or the
intention to patent their cell lines.
In these examples, Western researchers and corporations have appro-
priated from indigenous and local communities their scientific and
technical knowledge, the resources developed with that knowledge, and
even the cells of the people themselves. Historically, access to the local
knowledge of these communities and their biological resources has been
free because that knowledge and the related resources have been consid-
ered to be a part of anthropological studies and the public domain. This
view permits Western corporations to profit from the technological uses
made of indigenous knowledge and resources with no benefit given to the
indigenous and local communities themselves.
While a few of these examples of appropriation are quite old, most
have occurred within the last dozen or so years. The increasing interest
in both using and preserving the knowledge and resources of indigenous
and local communities stems from the development of a lucrative
biotechnology industry dependent on Southern genetic resources. This
development coincides with an increasing sense of urgency surrounding
the need to preserve genetic resources, with a recognition of the impor-
tance of involving local people in conservation efforts, and with the new
visibility of indigenous peoples' fight for survival, land rights, and self-
determination.
The growth of the biotechnology industry and of the use of geneti-
cally engineered materials in pharmaceuticals, agricultural supplies, and
many other industries has vastly increased the commercial value of
genetic resources in plants, animals, and microorganisms.43 Changes in
the nature of basic science have made it possible to apply research on life
forms to a number of different commercial activities, leading to an
emerging "genetics supply" or "life" industry that depends on raw genetic
material from fields, forests, and communities."
That material is fast disappearing. Species and varieties are becoming
extinct at unprecedented rates, due to the use of ever fewer high-yield
wih them. Il at 4. However, RAFI insists that a Freedom of Information Act request has turned
up no evidence of any direct contact between tribal members and the patent-holders. Id.
Regarding the patent application on the Solomon Islanders, in the wake of an international
outcry, U.S. officials have announced withdrawal of the application, but researchers could not
obtain any documentary proof of the withdrawal. Id. at 5.
43. Conserving Indigenous Knowledge, supra note 21, at 4-5.
44. Id. at 6.
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commercial varieties in agricultural production, the loss of habitat, and
other factors.45 Much of the world's genetic diversity has been lost; for
instance, ninety-seven percent of the vegetable varieties sold by commer-
cial seed houses in the United States at the beginning of the century are
now extinct, as are eighty-seven percent of the pear and eighty-six
percent of the apple varieties.'6 Half of Europe's domesticated animal
species have become extinct in this century. 47 Most of the world's
remaining biodiversity is concentrated in "gene-rich" Southern countries
where most indigenous and traditional communities are also located. For
agricultural crops, the genes necessary to combat new diseases and
maintain yields come to a large extent from the South.
The alarming loss of ecosystem, species, and genetic diversity led to
negotiation of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, 48 which
brought concerns over the use and appropriation of indigenous and local
scientific knowledge of natural resources and systems squarely within an
international ecological perspective. Among its stated objectives is "the
fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of
genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources
and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account
all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate
funding. '49 In other words, under the Convention the conservation of, and
access to, Southern biodiversity, including its genetic diversity, is to be
exchanged for access to Northern biotechnology and funding. To help
accomplish this, the Convention vests sovereign rights to biological
resources, including genetic resources, in the State. 0
45. Rebecca L. Margulies, Note, Protecting Biodiversity: Recognizing International
Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Genetic Resources, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 322, 323-27
(1993); see also CALESTOUS JUMA, THE GENE HUNTERS: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE SCRAMBLE
FOR SEEDS 100 (1989).
46. CARY FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, POLITICS AND THE LOSS OF
GENETIC DIVERSITY 63 (1990).
47. Conserving Indigenous Knowledge, supra note 21, at 14. The loss of genetic variation
within species leaves species vulnerable to attack by pests and diseases. Jack R. Kloppenburg
& Daniel L. Kleinman, Preface, Plant Genetic Resources: The Common Bowl, in SEEDS AND
SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 6-7 (Jack R.
Kloppenburg ed., 1988) [hereinafter SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY]. Access to new and unknown
varieties of useful plants is essential to strengthening resistance to such plagues. Id. at 7.
48. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 822
(1992).
49. Id. art. 1.
50. The Preamble, Article 3, and Article 15 all reaffirm the sovereignty of States over their
natural resources. Id. pmbl, art. 3, art. 15. Article 15 specifically recognizes that access to
genetic resources is subject to State law. Id. art. 15. This marks a change from the prior status
of genetic resources as part of the "common heritage" of humanity. See discussion infra Part
II.C.
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The concern over biodiversity loss reflected in the Convention has led
to increasing recognition that indigenous and local communities preserve
much of the world's remaining biodiversity and are thus necessary
partners in biodiversity conservation efforts.5' Indigenous and local
communities have long excelled at identifying and classifying the names,
properties, and uses of the biodiversity found on their lands,52 and they
have often known how to take better advantage of that biodiversity than
Western scientists. For example, by consulting indigenous peoples,
bioprospectors can increase the success ratio in trials for useful substances
from one in 10,000 samples to one in two.53
Coupled with the increasing recognition of indigenous and local
communities' crucial role in biodiversity preservation is a general re-
valuing of the positive role of indigenous and local communities in
sustainable development.54 An emerging view that indigenous and local
communities can and must be involved in resource conservation efforts
contrasts with the more traditional view of such communities as back-
wards despoilers who must be removed and excluded from protected
nature areas and conservation programs.55 In part, this shift in views
While granting States sovereignty over their resources, the Convention also imposes
several restrictions or burdens on that sovereignty. Thus States must facilitate access to genetic
resources, must share the results of research and development, and must share the benefits
arising from commercial uses of genetic resources. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra
note 48, art. 15.2, 17.2, 19.2. States must also facilitate access to, and transfer of, biotechnology
to developing countries "under fair and most favorable terms." Id. art. 16; see generally Steven
M. Rubin & Standwood C. Fish, Biodiversity Prospecting: Using Innovative Contractual
Provisions to Foster Ethnobotanical Knowledge, Technology, and Conservation, 5 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. LAW & POL'Y 23, 31-36 (1994). The Convention also requires States to
inventory, monitor, and preserve biological diversity within their boundaries. Convention on
Biological Diversity, supra note 48, art. 7.
Much literature exists on the Convention on Biological Diversity and its implications. See,
e.g., Symposium, Biodiversity: Opportunities and Obligations, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613
(1995); Klaus Bosselmann, Plants and Politics: The International Legal Regime Concerning
Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. LAW & POL'Y 111 (1996); Karen A.
Goldman, Note, Compensation for Use of Biological Resources Under the Convention on
Biological Diversity: Compatibility of Conservation Measures and Competitiveness of the
Biotechnology Industry, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 695 (1994).
51. See generally, WALTER V. REID ET AL., BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING: USING GENETIC
RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1993).
52. Indigenous and local community members have often developed a far more complex
taxonomy of their local flora and fauna and a more complete understanding of local ecosystems
than have Western researchers. See, e.g., Michael Howes, The Uses of Indigenous Knowledge
in Development, in INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS AND DEVELOPMENT 341, 343 (D.
Brokensha et al. eds., 1980).
53. Conserving Indigenous Knowledge, supra note 21, at 22.
54. See, e.g., Agenda 21, para. 3.2, reprinted in, AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEED-
INGS at 24 (Nicolas A. Robinson ed., 1993) (concluding that conservation programs will fail
to be sustainable unless the basic needs of the people who depend on targeted resources for
their livelihoods are satisfied).
55. See Lee P. Breckenridge, Protection of Biological and Cultural Diversity: Emerging
Recognition of Local Community Rights in Ecosystems Under International Environmental Law,
(Vol. 17:919
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arises from increasing stress on incentives, rather than sanctions, as a key
tool in resource conservation.56 The shift in views is further fueled by a
re-evaluation of the lessons indigenous and traditional medicine can
provide for Western medicinal practice. Thus the "shaman" is no longer
a "witch doctor" but a healer with knowledge of traditional remedies
worthy of new respect from Western science." In essence, then, the shift
in views reflects a more general appreciation of the special contributions
and needs of indigenous and local peoples 58 and of the value of cultural
as well as biological diversity in an ever more homogeneous and threat-
ened world.
II. MECHANISMS OF APPROPRIATION: WHAT COUNTS
AS VALUABLE KNOWLEDGE?
Perhaps the most prevalent and insidious form of appropriation of
indigenous knowledge and resources has been the construction of con-
ceptual and legal categories of valuable knowledge and resources that
systematically exclude the knowledge and resources of local communities,
farmers, and indigenous peoples. This construction of exclusion takes
several forms. First, Western science characterizes certain natural materi-
als that indigenous and local communities have cared for, preserved,
improved, and developed as mere "wild" species or, at the most, as
"primitive species" (commonly known as "landraces.)" Formal, scientific
systems of innovation and research have therefore, at least until recently,
denigrated and denied the value of indigenous and subsistence farmers'
informal systems of knowledge-transmission and innovation. Second,
while the products of formal knowledge systems have been protected as
"property," those of informal, traditional systems have been tagged the
freely available "common heritage of humanity." In particular, patent-
ability under current intellectual property law is systematically biased
against the innovations and knowledge of indigenous and farmers'
I i
59 TENN. L. REV. 735, 746-48 (1992); see also WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE ET AL., GLOBAL
BIODIVERSITY STRATEGY: GUIDELINES FOR ACTION TO SAVE, STUDY, AND USE EARTH'S BIOTIC
WEALTH SUSTAINABLY AND EQUITABLY 79-96 (1992).
56. See generally Jon H. Goldstein, The Prospects for Using Market Incentives to
Conserve Biological Diversity, 21 ENVT'L. L. 985 (1991).
57. See generally S.A. THORPE, SHAMANS, MEDICINE MEN AND TRADITIONAL HEALERS
(1993).
58. These contributions include a detailed and sophisticated knowledge of local ecosys-
tems, traditional practices which often prove to be the most sustainable form of resource use,
forms of community organization which promote sustainability as well as values of affiliation
with a particular place, a concern for future generations, and a commitment to the collective
good which Western society has not been able to emulate, let alone surpass. Breckenridge,
supra note 55, at 746-48.
59. Conserving Indigenous Knowledge, supra note 21, at 1.
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communities. Finally, the products of indigenous and local communities'
knowledge have been detached from their ecological and sociocultural
base through removal and preservation in Northern-dominated ex situ
collections and projects, while the knowledge underlying the products
attains merely anthropological interest. Thus Western science and industry
treat the living knowledge of existing indigenous and local communities
as "quaint," "quackery," or "quits. ' 60
In the subsequent discussion, I shall refer both to the knowledge of
plant, animal, and soil uses - in other words, preparations and applica-
tions held by indigenous and traditional communities - and to the
material resources, like plant varieties, connected to this knowledge.
While the law generally distinguishes between tangible and intangible
property, here the two are so closely interlinked that the distinction is
unhelpful. The tangible resources at issue are commercially valuable
mostly because of their intangible genetic information, and the purpose
of appropriation is to gain access to this information so that it can then
be synthesized in a laboratory.
More importantly, to a large extent these tangible resources exist in
their current form thanks to the applied knowledge of indigenous and
local communities, a knowledge uniquely gained from conserving and
often improving resources for specific purposes. 6' For these communities,
the differences between intellectual, cultural, and material property are
artificial.62 All are part of the communities' heritage:
"Heritage" is everything that belongs to the distinct identity of a
people and which is theirs to share, if they wish, with other peoples.
It includes all of those things which international law regards as the
creative production of human thought and craftsmanship, such as
60. Id. Even the designation of Northern and Southern innovation, respectively, as
"formal" and "informal" reflect the biases of Western science. Until scholars discover better
terminology, I will use the conventional terms that frame this debate over appropriation.
61. Indigenous and local resources could easily be considered part of the cultural property
of these groups, intimately connected to their definition and survival. Cultural property is
understood here as those objects of historical, archeological, artistic, or ethnographic interest
that are bound up in a peoples' identity, history, and future sense of self. See generally, James
A.R. Nafziger, Protection of Cultural Property, 17 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 283 (1987); Peter H.
Welsh, Repatriation and Cultural Preservation: Potent Objects, Potent Pasts, 25 MICH. J.L.
REFORM 837 (1992).
62. The Indigenous Peoples' Biodiversity Network, in a statement to the Conference of
Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity, explained that "(flor us biodiversity and
indigenous knowledge are inseparable. They are a collective, inalienable, and integral part of
our cultures, in all ways: at the spiritual, cultural, intellectual, territorial, scientific and economic
levels." Indigenous Peoples' Statement on Access and IPRs, Second Conference of the Parties
to the Convention of Biological Diversity, Dec. 10, 1995, reprinted in SEEDLING Dec. 1995,
at 13.
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songs, stories, scientific knowledge and artworks. It also includes
inheritances from the past and from nature, such as human remains,
the natural features of the landscape, and naturally-occurring species
of plants and animals with which a people has long been connect-
ed.63
Furthermore, for indigenous communities, their heritage does not consist
of mere economic rights over things but of a bundle of relationships with
the animals, plants, and places involved. 64 One of the main mechanisms
of appropriation has been precisely the separation of what is considered
knowledge from what is considered a physical resource. Ending appropri-
ation requires viewing them together.
A. Wildness, Landraces, and the Construction
of Agricultural Value
Indigenous and local farming communities have contributed signifi-
cantly to the quality and diversity of the germplasm that forms the basis
of Western crop production. 5 Genes for fifteen major crops that first
grew in the fields of developing countries now contribute more than
$50,000,000 in annual sales in the United States alone.6 Community-
based innovation systems develop and maintain this crucial genetic
diversity because indigenous farmers breed varieties suited to their
specific local needs and microenvironments.
Western science has been largely unable to recognize or value the
role of indigenous and local farming communities because the innovators
themselves have been invisible, the forms of transmission of knowledge
incomprehensible, and the purpose of the work has differed from that of
much formal science. Thus the indigenous farmer's work of testing,
comparing, and breeding "folk" varieties of seed is usually not recognized
as "plant breeding" by Western researchers. 67 Performed in fields over the
centuries rather than in laboratories over a few years, the indigenous
63. Erica-Irene Daes, Study on the Protection of the Cultural and Intellectual Property of
Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 14, at para. 24, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28 (1993).
64. Id at para. 26.
65. See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, HARVESTING
NATURE'S DIVERSITY 8 (1993) [hereinafter HARVESTING DIVERSITY].
66. Conserving Indigenous Knowledge, supra note 21, at 19.
67. RAFI cites several examples of informal innovation, including Kayapo women in
Brazil who preserve representative crop samples in hillside "gene banks," the Mende farmers
of Sierra Leone who conduct field trials testing new seeds against different soil types and then
compare notes, and Ethiopian farmers who document the performance of different varieties on
doorposts. Hungoo, Arrogance and the 'Gene' Revolution, supra note 34, at 2.
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farmer's plant breeding is necessarily highly specific to the local environ-
ment.68 That the resulting farmers' varieties or landraces are known as
"primitive" is perhaps the clearest expression of the cultural biases
inherent in the distinctions of Western science.69
Western researchers often fail to appreciate innovative indigenous
farming practices because the innovators or "plant breeders" are peasant
women. Women in many parts of the world play key roles in seed
selection, vegetative propagation, and livestock management - all central
to preserving and fomenting diversity.7 ° Often, their work of breeding and
management takes place in kitchen gardens for domestic consumption
rather than in outlying fields worked for income.71 This work may or may
not be recognized within the local communities, where women often lack
visibility and power, but it is clearly unrecognized by Western-style
farmers, extension agents, and researchers visiting from afar.72
Western researchers also fail to recognize the role of indigenous and
traditional farmers in plant breeding and selection because the farmers
share their knowledge in ways incomprehensible to Western science.
Indigenous and traditional peoples transmit much knowledge about the
qualities and uses of plants, animals, and microorganisms orally, often
through stories and songs. Descriptions of uses of plants, animals, or soils
for medicinal purposes may also be dismissed because the corresponding
maladies or diseases are described in ways that integrate the physical,
68. Farmers' varieties or landraces
are the outcome of a continuous and dynamic development process. They are not
stable products which have existed for time immemorial or which have remained
static after coming into being ... [but reflect] adaptation to local agro-ecological
production conditions, local sub-optimal production conditions, and to the specific
production preferences of different socio-economic, gender and ethnic groupings
within farming communities.
Kojo Amanor et al., Introduction to CULTIVATING KNOWLEDGE: GENETIC DIVERSITY, FARMER
EXPERIMENTATION AND CROP RESEARCH 1, 2 (Walter de Boef et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter
Cultivating Knowledge].
See generally JOINING FARMERS' EXPERIMENTS: EXPERIENCES IN PARTICIPATORY
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT (Bertus Haverkort et al. eds., 1991) and CULTIVATING KNOWL-
EDGE, supra, for numerous examples of the plant breeding experimentation performed by, and
in, traditional and local rural communities.
69. See SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 47, at 7-8.
70. HARVESTING DIVERSITY, supra note 65, at 6 ("Women produce an estimated 80
percent of food in Africa, 60 percent in Asia and the Pacific and 40 percent in Latin Ameri-
ca.").
71. Id.
72. Id.; see also Consuelo Quiroz, Biodiversity, Indigenous Knowledge, Gender and
Intellectual Property Rights, 2 INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE & DEV. MONITOR 12 (1994); Maria
Fernandez, Gender and Indigenous Knowledge, 2 INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE & DEV. MONITOR
6 (1994).
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mental, and spiritual and so are alien to Western researchers.73 Such
knowledge is easily dismissed as folklore, superstition, old wives' tales,
or the quaint remnants of dying cultures. Similarly, questions asked by
Western researchers may elicit confusing or meaningless responses
because they do not correspond to the classifications of phenomena used
by the indigenous or local people. Such responses are therefore discount-
ed and the respondents classified as backwards and ignorant.74
Moreover, Western researchers may also overlook traditional farmers'
role in plant breeding and selection because many of the useful genetic
characteristics of plants are found not in "domesticated" varieties but in
those related varieties that are not cultivated.7s Western researchers label
these species, which can be found in the environs of indigenous andtradtioal •• •76
traditional farming communities, wild or semi-wild. Western researchers
consider these species to have ended up in underdeveloped areas by luck
or natural bounty. Yet it is now becoming clear that almost all the
different types of species to be found in and around traditional rural
communities have been nurtured or developed by local people.77 Far from
being "wild," these partner or "associated" species are often an integrated
part of farming or forest/farming systems.78
73. See, e.g., Linda Green, Fear as a Way of Life, 9 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 227, 247
(1994) (for example, ailments are described as susto (fright) or penas (grief) in Guatemalan
altiplano communities). RAFI describes the use of a serpent-wood species in India over the
centuries to treat a variety of maladies including hypertension; pharmaceutical companies
recently "discovered" the root and it now serves as the basis of a widely used hypertension
drug. Conserving Indigenous Knowledge, supra note 21, at 22; see also Micheal J. Huft,
Comment, Indigenous Peoples and Drug Discovery Research: A Question of Intellectual
Property Rights, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1678, 1698 (1995) (noting that traditional cultures may
interpret various symptoms of malaria as separate diseases), citing Nina L. Etkin & Paul J.
Ross, Recasting Malaria, Medicine and Meals: A Perspective on Disease Adaptation, in THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF MEDICINE 230, 235 (Lola Ramanucci-Ross et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991).
Appropriation in this case can occur because traditional Indian healers' had no category
corresponding exactly to the Western concept of hypertension - indeed, a separate disease
known as hypertension may not have existed in those communities.
74. Glynn Custred and Deborah Fink have discussed these problems in their works on
language and measurement categories among traditional peoples. See Glynn Custred,
Ethnosemantic Analysis As a Tool in The Designing and the Realization of Population and
Agricultural Censuses, in INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note
52, at 233; Deborah Ruth Fink, The Bono Concept of Measure: An Essential Factor in Formal
and Nonformal Educational Programs, in INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS AND DEVELOP-
MENT, supra note 52, at 245.
75. THE CRUCIBLE GROUP, PEOPLE, PLANTS AND PATENTS: THE IMPACT OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY ON BIODIVERSITY, CONVERSATION, TRADE AND RURAL SOCIETY 44-45
(1994).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 44.
78. Id. Partner or "associated" species have played a key role in maintaining food
production and improving resistance to diseases. HARVESTING DIVERSITY, supra note 65, at 9.
For example, a kind of rice grown by traditional farmers near Gonda in Utter Pradesh, India,
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Many indigenous and local communities draw a significant share of
their resources from these partner species and make little distinction
between wild and cultivated foods.79 Similarly, many indigenous and
traditional communities have conserved and protected wild plants known
to have medicinal qualities without formally cultivating them. These
communities also recognized the value of other wild plants and microor-
ganisms and protected them indirectly, through preservation and im-
provement of the local ecosystems of which they form a part.8" Yet,
because these plants are not cultivated in ways that are obvious to visiting
Western researchers, they are deemed to exist independently of human
intervention. As such, they are free for the taking.
The plant breeding and selection undertaken by indigenous and
traditional farmers also escapes notice because it is not necessarily aimed
at producing the highest possible yield for sale. Rather, these farmers,
who produce at least in part for their own consumption, may choose
lower-yielding varieties for traits including hardiness, flavor, and diversity
(as an insurance strategy) or even for religious associations." Western
researchers dismiss these varieties as nonproductive, low-yielding
cultivars that evidence the farmers' lack of initiative and ability. In
addition, these varieties have adapted to particular ecological conditions
and socio-ecological practices which cannot be easily replicated. Studies
show that traditional farmers aim to increase the diversity of their crop
base, encouraging diversity both within each crop and in the mixture of
food, forage, medicinal, shelter-related, and other useful plants grown, in
order to achieve "maximum complementarity and synergy between
different crops, animals, and people." 2
provided the single gene that gave resistance to a grassy-stunt virus which decimated Asian rice
fields during the 1970s. Id. Partner and associated species can also serve to supplement diets,
especially in times of scarcity or famine, and may eventually provide keys to new food sources.
Id.
79. The Chacoba of Bolivia, for example, use approximately "one-fifth to one-half of all
woody species for food and up to one-third for medicinal purposes." THE CRUCIBLE GROUP,
supra note 75, at 45. In western Kenya, people rely on wild species in gardens and forests for
up to one-half of their nutritional needs. IL
80. See Michel Pimbert, The Making of Agricultural Biodiversity in Europe, in REBUILD-
ING COMMUNITIES: EXPERIENCES AND EXPERIMENTS IN EUROPE, 59, 59-61 (Vithal Rajan ed.,
1993) [hereinafter REBUILDING COMMUNITIES].
81. See Bertus Haverkort & David Millar, Constructing Diversity: the Active Role of Rural
People in Maintaining and Enhancing Biodiversity, 2 ETNOECOLOGICA 51 (1994). Ecological
and genetic diversity provides small farmers some security against pests, diseases, and climactic
changes, even at the cost of lower yields. See id. at 55; see also THE KEYSTONE CENTER FINAL
CONSENSUS REPORT: GLOBAL INITIATIVE FOR THE SECURITY AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF PLANT
GENETIC RESOURCES, OSLO PLENARY SESSION 4-5 (1991).
82. Haverkort & Millar, supra note 81, at 53.
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Commercial breeders, in contrast, seek both uniformity and applica-
bility to a wide variety of conditions; maximum yield is generally the
criterion of success. 3 Thus commercial breeders relegate what has little
commercial applicability to the category of landrace, worthwhile only in
its potential for future incorporation into genetically engineered varieties
which can then be sold at market rates to a wide variety of farmers. 4
That indigenous and traditional communities might innovate for a differ-
ent purpose is rarely recognized.
B. Nonrecognition of Informal Innovation Systems
Much of the recent debate about appropriation of the scientific and
technical knowledge of indigenous and local peoples has centered on the
role of intellectual property rights in recognizing formal, but not informal,
innovation. Such rights, generally expressed through patents, have
historically served to provide financial rewards to those appropriating
indigenous knowledge and its products, while denying such rewards to
the communities whose knowledge is appropriated. Proposals for using
or modifying patent law to accommodate possible claims by these
communities will be dealt with in Part III: here I merely wish to summa-
rize the inherent cultural biases of the Western tradition of intellectual
property protection. I will often use U.S. law as an example because until
recently intellectual property has largely been a creature of national law
and because, with a few exceptions, the provisions I discuss are common
to Western legal systems.8 5
The aim of the patent system is to encourage innovation by providing
an inventor with a time-limited monopoly over her invention. In ex-
change, she must fully and publicly describe it and thereby make it
available to others.86 Patents may be granted for products or processes.
83. See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 46, at 54-63 (describing history of the develop-
ment of modem, commercial agriculture and its dependence on uniform plant varieties).
84. See id at 60-61.
85. Michael D. Davis presents a concise outline of U.S. patent law in Michael D. Davis,
The Patenting of Products of Nature, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 293, 302-305
(1995). The Paris Convention established the basic requirements for patentability. Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, as last revised in
Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter the Paris Conven-
tion].
86. As patent protection has expanded to cover new categories including drugs, living
matter, and plant and animal varieties, debate as to whether the system actually does encourage
innovation has grown. See generally THE CRUCIBLE GROUP, supra note 75, at 55-59 (weighing
the view that patents serve interests of the large and powerful, deter innovation, and reward
those with the largest legal staffs versus the view that patents are necessary to protect small,
fledgling inventors from predatory business practices and to encourage companies to invest in
research). This debate is beyond the scope of this article.
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They are generally granted on a national level, and each State may
usually decide what to exclude from patenting. Under the recently revised
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994), however, all
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) must provide "effec-
tive" protection of intellectual property rights, including those in living
matter.8 7
The following provisions of national and international laws governing
patentability systematically exclude indigenous and local communities'
knowledge from intellectual property protections.
1. Novelty or Newness
Patentable inventions must be novel or new.88 U.S. law accordingly
states that a patent cannot be issued if the invention was known or used
by others in the United States, if the invention was described by others
in a printed publication, or if the putative patent-holder did not himself
invent the subject matter sought to be patented.89 Thus patents reward the
kind of individual, secretive effort epitomized by the lone scientist in his
basement laboratory. TRIPS, which recognizes intellectual property rights
only as private rights, further reinforces the individual basis of patent
law.9' Rights belonging to the public, or a sector of it, do not fit easily
within this conception of a patentable invention.
Most indigenous and local knowledge, however, is collective and is
passed down from generation to generation. It builds on prior knowledge
in an organic, accretive way that makes it difficult to single out a certain
individual inventor or inventive origin in time. In those cases where it is
not widely held, as in the case of medicinal knowledge held by shamans,
87. GATT's Trade-Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS) provisions mandate patent
protection for microorganisms (viruses and fungi, for instance), similar to that now provided
in Northern countries. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
art. 27.3(b), LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M.
81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. Plants and animals, however, need not be patented under TRIPs,
nor must diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods of treatment. Id. However, plants must
be covered by either patents or an effective sui generis system. Id.
The European Patent Convention, in contrast, prohibits the patenting of plant and animal
varieties. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270 [herein-
after European Patent Convention]. The European Patent Convention does not, however, make
any mention of genetically engineered plants or animals as opposed to plant and animal
varieties. Id.
88. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994); TRIPS, supra note 87, art. 27.1.
89. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
90. TRIPS, supra note 87, pmbl; see Vandana Shiva, Farmers' Rights and the Convention
on Biological Diversity, in BIODIPLOMACY: GENETIC RESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 107, 115 (Vicente Sanchez & Calestous Juma eds., 1994) [hereinafter
BIODIPLOMACY].
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the accretion and transmission of knowledge from generation to genera-
tion would invalidate it on novelty grounds.
The novelty requirement means that inventors must seek a patent at
the earliest possible moment; if they do not, they cannot later "catch up."
Those whose inventions are now known cannot retroactively apply for
patent protection. Indigenous and traditional communities that had no
practical opportunity to participate in the development of world intellectu-
al property systems and that are only now beginning to debate and to
demand a place in those systems, albeit with much disagreement about
that place, are frozen out.
2. Nonobviousness or the Inventive Step
The TRIPS agreement requires that patentable items "involve an
inventive step,' '91 while U.S. law expresses the same requirement through
the term, nonobvious. 92 The test to determine if an invention is obvious
is whether a person skilled in the field would, with all of the prior art
available, see the invention as obvious.93 If the inventor merely examines
all prior knowledge and follows the next logical step to solve a problem,
then she has not overcome the nonobviousness requirement.94 I n cases
dealing with chemical compounds, when the prior art suggests that a
compound might display certain properties, applicants for a patent must
rebut a presumption of obviousness.95 One method is to show that the
compound displays "unexpectedly improved properties. 96 Since plant-
based genetic materials are simply biochemical compounds, the purifica-
tion or isolation of the genetic material must be accompanied by proof
that the transformed product demonstrates "unexpected properties."97
Clearly, proving the "unexpected properties" of many indigenous and
informal innovations would be tremendously difficult; the prior knowl-
edge of a plant's medicinal effects, for instance, would categorize any
unprocessed, indigenous use of the plant as obvious. Indigenous and local
communities, moreover, possess neither the means nor any inherent
reason to "improve" compounds in order to satisfy the nonobviousness
requirement.
91. TRIPS, supra note 87, art. 27.1.
92. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
93. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
94. See id.
95. See In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
96. 919 F.2d at 692. While this is not the only method, the burden is on the applicant to
show nonobviousness. Id.
97. Ex parte Gray, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922, 1924 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1989).
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3. Subject Matter
In addition to the novelty and nonobviousness requirements, U.S. law
imposes a subject matter requirement that is interpreted to mean that the
"products of nature" cannot be patented.9" The substance of a patent may
not be the discovery of some natural phenomenon. Thus medicinal plants
in their natural state, or even diluted or otherwise processed, are not
patentable. However, if a Western scientist isolates the plant's active
substance in a way that does not occur in nature, it becomes patentable.99
The knowledge gained outside a chemical laboratory is therefore down-
graded to a substance "which nature has intended to be equally for the
use of all men,"' 0 even though there may be no reason for indigenous
peoples to isolate or extract the exact chemical compounds which give a
substance its utility. Conversely, once a substance has been isolated in a
chemically pure or non-naturally occurring state, it becomes patentable
even though the knowledge of the substance's qualities may have been
widely known in indigenous communities.' 1 The inventiveness involved
in isolating and identifying a specific gene and non-naturally occurring
organism makes genetically engineered plants and animals patentable,"°
while that involved in selecting and preserving the same genetic qualities
in the field merely potentiates further development.10
3
98. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127
(1948). The difference between the novelty and nonobviousness requirements set forth in
§§ 102-103 and the subject matter requirements stemming from § 101 are sometimes
confusing. The Federal Circuit addresses this confusion and provides an explanation of the
anatomy of the patent statute in In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959-964 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
99. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co. 189 F 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("[The
purified substance] became for every practical purpose a new thing, commercially and
therapeutically."), affd in part and rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (upholding the
patentability of purified product); see also Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253
F.2d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 1958). For more detailed discussions, see Davis, supra note 85, at 320;
Kadidal, supra note 10, at 238; and Lester I. Yano, Comment, Protection of the Ethnobotanical
Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples, 41 UCLA L. REV. 443, 454 (1993).
100. Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Decs. Comm'r. Patents 123, 126.
101. See Davis, supra note 85, at 320 n.171; see also Kadidal, supra note 10. Kadidal
frames the issue by examining the way in which pharmaceutical companies have evaded the
"product of nature" doctrine through the use of "semi-synthetic" copycat methods. Kadidal then
suggests several mechanisms within patent law to protect natural substances from such copying
of genetic material. Id. at 243-257. Yet as another commentator observes: "[tihe issue is not
whether to lower the threshold for patentability to include products of nature, but whether there
is a need to reconceptualize the entire idea of 'inventiveness."' Edgar J. Asebey & Jill D.
Kempenaar, Biodiversity Prospecting: Fulfilling the Mandate of the Biodiversity Convention,
28 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 703, 711 (1995).
102. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980).
103. James 0. Odek, Bio-Piracy: Creating Proprietary Rights in Plant Genetic Resources,
2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 141, 153-56 (1994), criticizes developed countries' arguments that plant
genetic resources are of unknown value until they have been evaluated and their traits identi-
fied, that they cannot be priced, and that collection of germplasm does not result in deprivation
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The case of the neem seed is illustrative.1' 4 A seed itself would be a
"product of nature," and the traditional method of scattering seeds as a
pesticide would not be patentable since it was not "invented" by the
applicant. Nonetheless, patents have been granted for a process of
pretreating the neem bark which results in extracts with a greater degree
of purity. 5 Patents have also been issued for the active ingredient in the
seed, azadirachtin, and for insecticides derived from it," The derivatives,
because they are the product of a laboratory and are slightly modified
versions of the original, are no longer considered "products of nature."10 7
No recognition, or compensation, is due to the people who discovered the
beneficial uses of the seed and nurtured it through the centuries.
4. Industrial Application
A fourth requirement according to TRIPS is that inventions must be
"capable of industrial application."' 8 Some commentators1°9 argue that
this requirement excludes anyone who produces and innovates outside the
industrial (or agro-industrial) sector, although the assimilation of the
phrase to the U.S. requirement of "useful"" may allow for broader
interpretation. The underlying theory of TRIPS is that the inventor invents
in order to sell the invention and obtain economic benefits; however, the
less monetized the society, the less validity there is to this assumption.
Indeed, the very name of TRIPS - Trade-Related Intellectual Property
to the source country because only a few seeds are taken. On this last point, Odek points out
that the value of the whole lies in its genetic material, which is present even in minimal
amounts of material. Id.
104. Singh Nijar, supra note 14, at 4.
105. Id
106. Id.
107. Kadidal, supra note 10, at 239. Kadidal describes the manner in which pharmaceuti-
cal companies routinely evade the "product of nature" doctrine through duplicating a natural
compound's chemical structure and then introducing slight modifications that create a "new"
substance while retaining the beneficial effects of the original. Id.
108. TRIPS, supra note 87, art. 27.1.
109. See Shiva, supra note 90, at 107, 115.
110. See TRIPS, supra note 87, art. 27.1 n.1. Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the
test of usefulness requires a present beneficial application, which probably does encompass
inventions created for noncommercial purposes. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533
(1966) (citing Note on the Patent Laws, 3 Wheat. App. 13, 24). Brenner discusses in detail, and
provides a good overview of, the requirement of utility.
Recent patent applications on sequences of human DNA have caused great controversy.
See "Gene Boutiques" Stake Claim to Human Genome, RAFI COMMUNIQUE (Rural Ad-
vancement Found. Int'l, Ottowa, Ont.), May-June 1994, at 2-3. Although the first applications
filed by the NIH were eventually rejected because researchers had no idea what possible
usefulness the sequences might have, private companies have continued to file such "driftnet"
patent applications despite the "usefulness" rule. Id at 3.
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rights - indicates its application to goods potentially involved in interna-
tional trade, excluding those created for local or national consumption. To
the extent that patent systems privilege the protection of commodities,
they reflect a limited, Western view of the purposes of intellectual inquiry
and knowledge-seeking, one which attributes a profit motive to peoples
who may conduct their scientific inquiry for different reasons.
5. Reproducibility
Patent law also requires that the inventor describe the product or
process so that others skilled in the industry can reproduce it."' In the
case of biological materials not easily described in words, patent applicants
may deposit a sample of the biological material with a recognized
depository." 2 Again, this requirement works against the more site-specific,
less stable, and less uniform products of the informal innovation system.
By their nature, many inventions of indigenous and traditional communi-
ties can be reproduced only in the specific ecological, social, and cultural
conditions that gave rise to them. For example, the greater genetic
variability of farmers' seeds may mean that they will produce the desired
traits only under a certain combination of soils, rainfall, nearby crops, or
cultivation practices particular to a place or culture, and that even then
they may be less reliable than high-tech hybrid varieties. This characteris-
tic of variability does not make them any less innovative than laboratory
creations aimed at wider applicability. Yet to the extent that it becomes
more difficult for Western scientists to reproduce the desired traits of
indigenous inventions because of the complex combinations of necessary
ecological, social, and cultural conditions, the utility of the patent system
for such inventions is reduced.
6. Plant Breeders' Rights
Additional criteria apply to the protection of plant genetic resources
under intellectual property laws. Under TRIPS, these resources need not
be patented, but must be protected "either by patents or by an effective
sui generis system or by any combination thereof."" 3 The most well-
111. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
112. See In re Wands, 858 F2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
113. TRIPS, supra note 87, art. 27.3(b) reads: "Members may exclude from patentability
... plants and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially biological processes for the
production of plants or animals other than non-biological and micro-biological processes.
However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by
an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof."
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known existing sui generis system for plants is the Union for the Protec-
tion of Plant Varieties (UPOV)."14 UPOV sets minimum plant breeders'
standards and mandates plant breeders' rights for both the discovery and
breeding of new species. Protection for plant breeders under UPOV
differs from protection under a patent system in two important respects:
first, plant breeder rights allow the free use of a protected variety in
order to breed and commercialize other new varieties; and, secondly,
those systems have historically allowed farmers to save their own seed
for the next production cycle without paying royalties."' Over time,
UPOV has been amended to provide greater protection for breeders and
less for farmers. u 6 For example, farmers' rights to save seed are no
longer guaranteed, rights can be granted for discovery and breeding of
new varieties, and breeders' rights to compensation now extend to
"essentially derived varieties" which themselves came from protected
varieties." 7 All of these changes favor large research and agribusiness
concerns over farmers, especially in the traditional farming communities
where seed saving and sharing is a way of life.
As with patents, traditional farmers find it difficult to obtain protec-
tion for their own innovative breeding work under UPOV. To gain
UPOV protection, a plant variety must be: distinguishable from other
varieties through "precise recognition and description"; uniform or
"sufficiently homogeneous"; and "stable in its essential characteris-
tics. '"18 Uniformity and stability are traits usually sought by large agri-
business seed companies interested in selling seed for large-scale
monoculture harvesting. Traditional farmers, in contrast, may be more
interested in promoting adaptability to many different conditions and
may therefore select seeds tailored to many different micro-
environments.'" 9 Landraces may thus be less uniform and less stable
114. International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 33
U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter UPOV]. Almost all developed States and almost no
developing ones are parties. UPOV: Getting a Free TRIPs Ride?, SEEDLING, June 1996, at
23, 24. UPOV has two versions: a more "farmer-friendly" 1978 version and a more restrictive
1991 version. THE CRUCIBLE GROUP, supra note 75, at 63.
115. John H. Barton & Eric Christensen, Diversity Compensation Systems: Ways to
Compensate Developing Nations for Providing Genetic Materials, in SEEDS AND SOVER-
EIGNTY, supra note 47, at 338, 340.
116. Carlos M. Correa, Biological Resources and Intellectual Property Rights, 14 EUR.
INTELL. PRoP. REV. 154, 155-56 (1992).
117. Id
118. UPOV, supra note 114, art. 4.
119. See supra Part II.A.
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than commercial varieties. 120 As a result, UPOV twice disadvantages
traditional farmers by making it difficult for them to use the protected
varieties of others and by making it difficult for them to use UPOV to
protect their own innovations. While the requirements admittedly have a
technical rationale,12 1 they also reflect a bias in favor of large-scale
commercial agriculture.
C. Ex Situ Conservation and the "Common Heritage"
Intellectual property laws appropriate indigenous and local scientific
knowledge by denying it legitimacy as a protectable interest, thereby
allowing others to use it freely. The products of this knowledge are also
subject to appropriation. The fruits of indigenous and local knowledge
are tagged the "common heritage of humanity," rather than the evolving
product of defined living communities. While such "common heritage"
resources can be freely collected, those same resources, brought into
mostly Northern-controlled seed banks, gene banks, and laboratories, can
be "improved" and then given or sold to private interests which treat the
results as private property.
Of course, a great uncompensated removal and transport of plants
from one area to another commenced with Western exploration. The
world's great botanical gardens, Italian cuisine, and Irish potatoes,
among others, are products of the plant resource movements that accom-
panied the colonizations of the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries.
The unrestricted movement of plant genetic resources has improved
diets and increased sources of food and useful materials throughout the
world; toward these ends, farming communities often exchange seeds
with other communities.122 The problem is not with the free use and
exchange of resources per se, but with the designation of only some
resources as "common."
The fight over the status of plant genetic resources illustrates the
selective use of the "common heritage" principle. Under the auspices of
the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), States
negotiated a nonbinding International Undertaking on Plant Genetic
120. Id.
121. The UPOV requirements clearly attempt to address the need for adequate definition
and reproducibility of a new variety. See UPOV, supra note 114, at art. 4.
122. See, e.g., Mario E. Tapia & Alcides Rosas, Seed Fairs in the Andes: A Strategy for
Local Conservation of Plant Genetic Resources, in CULTIVATING KNOWLEDGE, supra note
68, at 111.
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Resources (Undertaking) in 1983."' The original version of the Under-
taking, supported by gene-rich Southern countries, declared that all plant
germplasm, both raw and elite breeders' lines, was equally part of the
"common heritage of mankind" and therefore available to all." The
original version of the Undertaking thus represented an attempt by
Southern countries to place laboratory-bred varieties on the same legal
plane as their own undeveloped plant genetic resources.
Predictably, most Northern countries rejected this version of the
Undertaking. 25 By 1989, arguing that the text conflicted with
UPOV, 26 FAO members had effectively added protection for breeders'
rights.1 27 By 1991, amendments to the Undertaking had practically
abandoned the "common heritage" principle for improved varieties,
while retaining it for farmers' varieties. 128 The inequality inherent in this
use of the "common heritage" principle led to its rejection in the 1992
Convention on Biological Diversity, which affirmed sovereign State
rights over genetic and other biological resources.' 29
123. International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, FAO Resolution 8/83, in
REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, 22d Sess., 285, U.N. Doe 83/REP (1983) (adopting International Undertaking on
Plant Genetic Resources).
124. See Margulies, supra note 45, at 322, 329-30; International Undertaking on Plant
Genetic Resources, supra note 123, at (a). The "common heritage" principle has been used to
describe areas where no one State has jurisdiction, areas such as the moon or the high seas.
Id. at 330. Developing countries have recently objected strenuously to extending the concept
to resources, like forests or genetic diversity, that exist within the sovereign territory of States.
See, e.g., discussion of Convention on Biological Diversity, infra notes 153-59 and accompa-
nying text.
125. See Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr. & Daniel Lee Kleiman, Seeds of Controversy:
National Property versus Common Heritage, in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND
CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES, supra note 47, at 173, 173-74. Eight States,
including the United States and several Western European countries, registered their rejection
of the Undertaking. Margulies, supra note 45, at 329.
126. UPOV implicitly recognizes free access to the original varieties in article 6. See
UPOV, supra note 114, art. 6. Breeders' rights accrue whether the initial variation from
which the protected variety comes is artificial or natural. Id.; see also Odek, supra note 103,
at 148.
127. HARVESTING DIVERSITY, supra note 65, at 11.
128. The amended Undertaking states that "the concept of mankind's heritage, as applied
in the [Undertaking] is subject to the sovereignty of the states over their plant genetic
resources." Annex 3 to the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, FAO
Resolution 3/91, in REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations, 26th Sess., 104, U.N. Doe 91/REP (1991). In exchange for recogni-
tion of plant breeders' rights, developed States agreed to the concept of "farmers' rights"
arising from farmers' contributions to the conservation and improvement of plant genetic
resources. See infra notes 163-70 and accompanying text for discussion of the implementa-
tion of farmers' rights.
129. See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 48, art. 15. The Preamble
affirms that "conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of humankind," but
the sovereign rights to negotiate access to such resources "on mutually agreed terms" makes
clear that "common concern" is not the same as "common heritage." Id. pmbl. & art. 15.4.
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The "common heritage" principle has long been applied to the col-
lection and storage of plant germplasm in seed banks. Seed banks are
giant iceboxes where seeds are stored under cold, dry conditions and
periodically grown out. 130 Many national agricultural institutions
maintain extensive seed collections; altogether, seed banks hold some
4.35 million crop accessions. 131 Sixteen International Agricultural Re-
search Centres (IARCs) collect wild and crop germplasm, including
varieties of wheat, corn, rice, potatoes, millet, sorghum, barley, and
livestock. 132 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Re-
search (CGIAR), an informal grouping of mostly Northern donor gov-
ernments, universities, research centers, and individuals, manages the
IARCs.
133
Seed banks and gene banks collect Southern germplasm and distrib-
ute it to gene-poor Northern countries; thus a large proportion of com-
mercially used genetic material moves to the Northern countries via the
IARCs. Studies estimate, for example, that twenty-one percent of the
U.S. wheat crop was derived from material stored at the International
Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, the IARC for wheat. 34 Seed
companies depend on this germplasm to sustain their genetically engi-
neered and hybrid varieties.
Furthermore, the IARCs have sometimes donated raw materials that
are subsequently incorporated into protected varieties by multinational
seed companies, even though the IARCs' stated purpose is to protect
and develop plant genetic resources for all of humanity. 13 Again, the
130. HARVESTING DIVERSITY, supra note 65, at 20.
131. In-Situ, Ex-Situ: Forgetting the Farmers?, GRAIN Biobriefing (Genetic Resources
Action International, Barcelona, Spain), June 1994, at 2. For an earlier estimate of 2.5 million
samples, see DONALD L. PLUNCKETr ET AL., GENE BANKS AND THE WORLD'S FOOD 110
(1987).
132. For a full description, see FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 46, at 130.
133. For many years, the legal status of the CGIAR Centers was uncertain. CGIAR is
headquartered in the World Bank, but it was unclear whether the resources in CGIAR centers
belonged to the host countries, the countries where the germplasm was collected, or the
researchers. Id. at 182.
After considerable debate, CGIAR recently agreed to turn the collections over to the FAO
to be held in trust for the international community. Revision of the International Undertaking
on Plant Genetic Resources, Analysis of Some Technical, Economic and Legal Aspects for
Consideration in Stage II: Access to Plant Genetic Resources and Farmers' Rights, Commis-
sion on Plant Genetic Resources, 6th Sess., FAO Doc. CPGR-6/95/8 Supp. (June 19-30,
1995).
134. Pat R. Mooney, Exploiting Local Knowledge: International Policy Implications, in
CULTIVATING KNOWLEDGE, supra note 68, at 175.
135. Declaring the Benefits: The North's Annual Profit for International Agricultural
Research Is in the Range of $4-5 Billion, OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES (Rural Advancement
Found. Int'l, Ottawa, Ont.), Oct. 1994, at 1-2. For example, a Pepsico subsidiary, Frito-Lay,
screened genebank accessions at the International Potato Centre (CIP) in Peru and is now
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germplasm in the banks is free, considered "common heritage," but the
products engineered in laboratories on the basis of this germplasm are
protected and must be bought. As a result, farmers from the areas where
the germplasm was originally protected and selected may end up "pay-
ing for the end product of their own genius.' 36
The storage of genetic materials in ex situ collections, moreover,
makes them practically inaccessible to indigenous and traditional com-
munities. Most genetic materials collected in Southern countries - sixty-
eight percent of all crop seed, eighty-five percent of all livestock breeds,
and eighty-six percent of microbial culture collections - are held at the
IARCs or in Northern countries.137 Indeed, Northern governments hold by
far the largest number of seed accessions.138 In addition, almost half the
accessions held are cereals, which are dominant in international trade,
while tubers and roots, which are important for indigenous farmers,
comprise only four percent of the accessions.
39
While these accessions are theoretically available to researchers and
farmers upon request, practical knowledge, distance, and cost obstacles
mean that the material is inaccessible to informal innovators in indige-
nous and local farming communities." Once stored, therefore, accessions
become functionally extinct for indigenous and local communities. Nor
is there any reason to think, moreover, that the improved breeding stock
developing proprietary varieties from the accessions screened. The Benefits of Biodiversity:
100+ Examples of the Contribution by Indigenous and Rural Communities in the South to
Development in the North, OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES (Rural Advancement Found. Int'l,
Ottawa, Ont.), Mar. 1994 at 3. CIP has also provided germplasm for the development of
patentable material to EscaGenetics of the United States and to Plant Genetic Systems of Bel-
gium, although in the latter case the patent extends only to Northern countries. Id.
136. Mooney, supra note 134, at 178.
137. Conserving Indigenous Knowledge, supra note 21, at 15.
138. According to the FAO's 1996 Report on the State of the World's Plant Genetic
Resources, the North holds 49.2% of all seed accessions, the South holds 41.2%, and CGIAR
holds 9.6%. Report on the State of the World's Plant Genetic Resources, FAO Doc. CGRFA-
EX2/96/2 (1996), summarized in Ex Situ Conservation: When the Fridge Breaks Down,
SEEDLING, June 1996, at 5, 9. The numbers look less balanced when one considers the
predominantly Southern origin of the accessions. Id. at 5.
139. Id.
140. The alienation of communities from the product of their own knowledge, moreover,
continues in recent international treaties: the Convention on Biological Diversity, with
extensive provisions concerning sovereign control over biological resources, does not affect the
ownership, control, or use of seed banks, thereby leaving the status quo intact. See generally
Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 48. Article 15.3 excludes ex situ collections
from the definition of those genetic resources to which States may control access. Id. art. 15.3.
Resolution 3 of the Conference Adopting the Convention recognizes that this problem will
have to be resolved as soon as possible. The Interrelationship Between the Convention on
Biological Diversity and the Promotion of Sustainable Agriculture, Resolution 3 of Conference
for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the Convention on Biological Diversity, June 1992
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 846.
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produced from IARC research will make its way back to farming com-
munities. According to one study, only fifteen percent of samples from
research centers connected to the international system, which includes
CGIAR and the IARCs, have gone to Southern nations.' 4' Additionally,
the Convention on Biological Diversity's exclusion of material currently
held in seed banks from its provisions on State sovereignty may legiti-
mize the ability of Northern governments and corporations to own and
control the valuable germplasm they currently hold. 42
While seed banks do contribute to the preservation of those genetic
resources that cannot otherwise be saved, the current focus on ex situ
collections has unfortunately established Northern formal scientific
control over large genetic stocks and undervalued, even ignored, the role
of living communities in the preservation of local biodiversity 43 Ex situ
collection strategies assume that living communities that have sustained
and developed biological resources in the past are unable or unqualified
to do so or are doomed to disappear. Thus these strategies attempt to
safeguard as much as possible of the resources formerly under living
communities' control without considering any active role for those
communities in either conservation or development. As indigenous com-
munities disappear, the response is not to attack the conditions that
threaten such communities, but to create ex situ knowledge banks that
will preserve their wisdom for future generations." No doubt a role
exists for such ex situ strategies, especially if designed and implemented
with the participation of indigenous and local communities themselves.
But such strategies can also underestimate the capacity of these commu-
nities to live and participate in current history and to use and develop
their knowledge and traditions, rather than have them simply preserved
in a mummified state.
45
These limitations on the ex situ collection system are most explicit in
the collection and attempted patenting of the human cell lines of indige-
141. FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 46, at 189.
142. See discussion supra note 140; see also THE CRUCIBLE GROUP, supra note 75, at 32.
143. There are additional problems with ex situ collections. Besides the sheer number of
strains to be stored, some seeds do not store well, others must be grown out frequently, and the
storage technology is subject to electricity shortages or other disasters. Moreover, plant
evolution cannot continue in seed banks. See June Starr & Kenneth C. Hardy, Not by Seeds
Alone: The Biodiversity Treaty and the Role for Native Agriculture, 12 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 85,
100 (1993).
144. See, e.g., EDITH BROwN WEISS, supra note 1, at 270-78.
145. Many NGOs and associations of indigenous peoples have stressed the need to
incorporate, and consult with, indigenous and traditional communities in on-farm or
territorially-based conservation efforts. See, e.g., WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE ET AL., supra
note 55, at 79-86.
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nous peoples themselves. The Human Genome Diversity Project (Diver-
sity Project), an informal consortium of universities and scientists in
Europe and North America, plans to collect samples of the DNA of some
700 indigenous communities." 6 The Diversity Project's purpose is to
preserve the genetic map of disappearing ethnic groups because the
peculiar genetic characteristics of such groups could someday prove
invaluable to medicine. The underlying premise of the Diversity Project,
therefore, is that these indigenous groups will inevitably disappear; they
are accordingly referred to as "Isolates of Historic Interest" "that should
be sampled before they disappear as integral units so that their role in
human history can be preserved."' 47 The Diversity Project aims to spend
$23 to $35 million over a period of five years to collect blood samples
to be stored at the American Type Culture Collection in Rockville,
Maryland. Until recently, little effort had been made to consult with, or
include, indigenous people in the design of the Diversity Project.'48 Yet
under this type of project, the very being of indigenous peoples becomes
part of the "common heritage," to be collected and stored outside their
control.
III. ANSWERS TO APPROPRIATION
The last several years have witnessed a lively and complex debate on
the mechanisms needed to reverse the appropriation of indigenous and
local scientific and technical knowledge. As a result, there is general
agreement that Northern countries should acknowledge the role of
Southern countries and societies in preserving and enhancing such
knowledge and the associated resources, but this consensus extends to
little else. Pervasive throughout this debate is a difference in the scope of
146. Christine Toomey, Gene Pirates Bleed Indians for Aids Cure, TIMES OF LONDON,
June 4, 1995, at 22 [hereinafter Gene Pirates].
147. Patents, Indigenous Peoples, and Human Genetic Diversity, RAFI COMMUNIQUE
(Rural Advancement Found. Int'l, Ottawa, Ont.), May 1993, at 3, citing Draft Proceedings of
the Second Human Genome Diversity Workshop, Oct. 29-31, 1991 (Pa. St. U., State College,
Pa.).
148. Guaymi Indians protested that blood samples were taken from them under false
pretenses. Gene Pirates, supra note 146. Researchers who patented the human "T-lymphotropic
virus" of a member of the Hagahai tribe of Papua New Guinea insist that they discussed the
possible patenting of the cell line and stated that half of any resulting royalties would be given
to the tribe. Reginald Rhein, Canadian Group Is 'Mouse that Roared' on Gene Patents,
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Dec. 4, 1995, at 1, 3. Nonetheless, at the November 1995
meeting of the Conference of Parties of the Biodiversity Convention, some South Pacific
governments expressed concern over the patents. Id. In the wake of considerable controversy,
the Human Diversity Genome Project researchers have begun talking to representatives of
indigenous peoples' groups about their concerns. Gene Pirates, supra note 146. However, even
if "informed consent" for research were to be granted, it is unclear what truly informed consent
would mean in a vastly different cultural context and where the consent of entire groups and
communities, not individuals, is at stake.
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the goals pursued: some schemes stress compensation for past and future
contributions while assuming unrestricted access, while other schemes
focus on control over access and stress the right of communities, as well
as States, to decide when and whether their knowledge and resources are
to be used.
A second issue also permeates the debate: whether the rights to
knowledge and resources should be vested in individuals, States, and/or
communities. Vesting rights only in individuals, as described above in
Part II, marginalizes the interests and contributions of indigenous and
traditional communities. Vesting rights in the State alone as representa-
tive of its communities also has several drawbacks. 149 First, States have
not generally been protective of the rights or interests of indigenous and
traditional communities and have, in fact, often been among the primary
forces facilitating their destruction. Second, there is little reason to
conclude that resources obtained by the State on behalf of communities
will actually be used for their benefit, as a history of misguided "devel-
opment" projects demonstrates. 5° Third, State ownership of resources
often results in a centralized bureaucracy that is inimical to both contin-
uing innovation and appropriate preservation of natural resources.'
15
Fourth, from a resource conservation perspective, resources are more
likely to be effectively protected if local communities are invested and
involved in their use and stewardship.'52 While there may be a role for
the State as a mediating device or as a translator of rights into domestic
law, this need not mean that the State is the exclusive holder of rights
over the resource.
The final approach would posit international recognition of, and
support for, a direct role for communities themselves as subjects as well
as objects of the law. Several international instruments already recognize
to some extent the special role of indigenous and local communities. For
example, the Convention on Biological Diversity makes explicit the link
between community resources and conservation. Its Preamble recognizes
"the close and traditional dependence of many indigenous and local
communities embodying traditional lifestyles on biological resources, and
149. Vesting rights in the State could take several forms: direct ownership of resources,
residual ownership of only those resources or knowledge that cannot be clearly traced to
particular communities or individuals, or a trust on behalf of groups or communities. While I
believe a trust relationship is the most viable option, a trust without effective input and
participation by beneficiaries would be simply another form of appropriation.
150. See generally BRUCE RICH, MORTGAGING THE EARTH (1994) (criticizing internation-
ally financed development projects for exacerbating the gap between rich and poor, displacing
millions, and wreaking ecological disaster).
151. See Odek, supra note 103, at 176.
152. See Fulai Sheng, Integrating Economic Development with Conservation, in RE-
BUILDING COMMUNITIES, supra note 80, at 35-37.
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the desirability of sharing equitably benefits arising from the use of
traditional knowledge, innovations and practices relevant to the conser-
vation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its compo-
nents.' 53
The Convention commits States to take measures, "as far as possible
and as appropriate," to establish in situ conservation measures. 154 As part
of that effort, each State party shall:
Subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local
communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the con-
servation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote
their wider application with the approval and involvement of the
holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage
the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of
such knowledge, innovations and practices. 55
This provision recognizes for the first time in a global treaty the special
function of indigenous and local communities in the innovation and
preservation of biological knowledge. It also commits other treaty parties
to overseeing the relationship between States and the indigenous and
local communities within their territory, although it leaves implementa-
tion squarely in the hands of national governments. The exact reach of
the provision is presently unclear, and it admittedly leaves the extent and
manner in which benefits are to be shared to the discretion of each State.
Indeed, the reference to national legislation and the lack of concrete
obligations weaken the provision. Other Convention articles committing
States to guaranteed access to genetic resources may reduce the ability of
indigenous and local communities to control their knowledge and
resources.156 The Second Conference of the Parties of the Convention in
November 1995 touched on the need to develop mechanisms to
recognize the rights of indigenous and local communities separate from
current intellectual property rights. Several delegates, especially those
from developing countries, have been quite vocal about the need for
incentives to be given to indigenous and local communities and for com-
pensation to be given to farmers.'57 The implementation of article 8(j)
153. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 48, pmbl.
154. Id. art. 9.
155. Id. art. 8(j). Furthermore, the Convention commits States to "protect and encourage
customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional cultural practices..." Id.
art.10(c). Articles 17.2 and 18.4 refer to indigenous and traditional knowledge and technolo-
gies. Id art. 17.2, 18.4.
156. See discussion infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., comments of India, Malaysia and others during the Second Conference of
the Parties to the CBD, as reported in Report of the Second Session, Protocol, 9(17) EARTH
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will be one of the central agenda points of the Third Conference of the
Parties in 1996.58
Other declarations arising from the 1992 United Nations' Conference
on Environment and Development also reference the need for indigenous
and local community involvement in decisionmaking on environmental
and resource issues. The Rio Declaration in Principle 22 reads:
Indigenous people and their communities, and other local commu-
nities, have a vital role in environmental management and develop-
ment because of their knowledge and traditional practices. States
should recognize and duly support their identity, culture and inter-
ests and enable their effective participation in the achievement of
sustainable development. 59
The Forest Principles statement also contains several similar statements,
as does Agenda 21, the action plan arising from the 1992 Conference.' 60
The 1994 Convention on Desertification obligates signatory countries
to promote awareness and encourage participation amongst local popula-
tions in the battle against drought and desertification and so acknowl-
edges the value of drawing on their expertise.161 The Convention also
specifically provides for compensation to the members of local popula-
NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN (visited Sept. 15, 1996) <http://www.mbnet.mb.ca/linkages/vol09/
0917000e.html> at <http://www.mbnet.mb.ca/linkages/vol09/0917023e.html to
/0917024e.html>. See also the excellent report by the Convention on Biological Diversity
Secretariat: Ownership Of and Access to, Ex-Situ Genetic Resources, Farmers' Rights and
Rights of Similar Groups, May 3, 1994, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/IC/2/13.
158. See Consideration of Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention, Final Conference Report of
Second Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Decision 11/7, Annex II, Nov. 30, 1995, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP2119.
159. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, Principle 22, 31
I.L.M. 874 (1992).
160. The Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global
Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of
Forests (Forest Principles), U.N. Conference on Environmental Development, Provisional
Agenda Item 9, at paras. 2(d) & 5(a), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/6 (1992) states that
"[g]ovemments should promote and provide opportunities for the participation of interested
parties, including local communities and indigenous people ... in the development, imple-
mentation and planning of national forest policies" and that "[n]ational forest policies should
recognize and duly support the identity, culture and rights of indigenous people, their commu-
nities and other communities and forest dwellers." Agenda 21, the Conference's action plan,
calls for participation of indigenous communities in the "economic and commercial benefits
derived from the use of ... traditional methods and knowledge." AGENDA 21: THE UNITED
NATIONS PROGRAMME OF ACTION FROM Rio at 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5, U.N. Sales No.
E.93.I.11 (1993), para. 15.4(g). Other sections speak more generally about the need for
community involvement. See, e.g., id, para. 18.9(c) (advocating "full public participation,
including that of women, youth, indigenous people, local communities in water management
policy-making and decision-making"); id. para. 3.5(a) (calling for "empowerment of local and
community groups").
161. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification In Those Countries Experi-
encing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly In Africa, U.N. GAOR 5th Sess.,
Agenda Item 2, U.N. Doc. A/AC.241/15/Rev.7 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1328 (1994),
arts. 17, 19.
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tions who convey knowledge that is ultimately commercially utilized or
incorporated into technology to combat drought or desertification.
162
The FAO's Undertaking 163 balances recognition of elite variety plant
breeders' rights with the concept of farmers' rights. Farmers' rights are
defined as "rights arising from the past, present and future contributions
of farmers in conserving, improving and making available plant genetic
resources. ' ' Although the current language recognizes the collective
nature of farmers' contributions, farmers' rights are not vested in farmers
or farming communities directly but in "the International Community, as
trustee for present and future generations of farmers.' 65 Farmers' rights
are to ensure that "farmers, farming communities and their countries
receive a just share of the benefits derived from plant genetic resources"
in order to encourage conservation and further development of these
resources.166
To implement farmers' rights, the FAO set up a fund to support
future research by farmers as well as conservation and utilization pro-
grams. 67 Contributions to the fund, unlike intellectual property royalty
payments, are voluntary and thus are likely to be meager. The renegotia-
tion of the funding scheme has awaited the creation of a Global Plan of
Action and the renegotiation of the Undertaking. 168 Thus the Undertaking
recognizes the contributions of farmers, but provides for neither owner-
ship of these contributions nor direct compensation for their use.
16 9
Human rights instruments also have recognized the interests of
indigenous peoples in traditional knowledge and its fruits. 170 The Inter-
162. Id. at arts. 17(1)(c), 18(l)(e). For an overview of the Convention, see William C.
Bums, The International Convention to Combat Desertification: Drawing a Line in the Sand?,
16 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 831 (1995).
163. See the discussion of the Undertaking supra notes 123-24.
164, Farmers' Rights, FAO Resolution 5/89, in REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF FAO,




167. HARVESTING DIVERSITY, supra note 65, at 21.
168. The Global Plan of Action was completed and approved at the Fourth International
Technical Conference on Plant Genetic Resources in Leipzig, Germany in June 1996. See infra
note 209. That conference produced significant debate, with the U.S. and other countries
insisting that farmers' rights was merely a concept and not a legal right. Id. The resulting text
deferred all discussion of farmers' rights to renegotiation of the Undertaking. ld. Funding
sources and requirements were also left deliberately vague. Id. The Undertaking renegotiation
process will next be taken up in a meeting of FAO's Commission on Genetic Resources in
Food and agriculture in December 1996. Things To Look For, 9(47) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS
BULLETIN <http://www.mbnet.mb.ca/linkages/vo09/0947022e.html>.
169. See Intellectual Property Rights for Whom?, supra note 23.
170. General human rights instruments protect intellectual property rights, albeit in a
limited way. For example, Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides
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national Labour Organization's Convention Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries requires special measures to
safeguard the property, labor, environment, and cultures of indigenous
peoples.'' Moreover, where the State retains the ownership of resources
related to lands, it must consult with indigenous peoples before permitting
exploration or exploitation of such resources on their lands.
172
The Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, approved
by the United Nations' Human Rights Subcommission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1994, calls for a "right to
restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken
without th[e] free and informed consent [of indigenous peoples] or in
violation of their laws, traditions and customs.' 173 More specifically,
article 29 states:
Indigenous peoples are entitled to the recognition of the full own-
ership, control and protection of their cultural and intellectual
property.
They have the right to special measures to control, develop and
protect their sciences, technologies and cultural manifestations,
that "[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author." G.A. Res. 217 (III),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 27.2 U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). The singular pronoun, if strictly
interpreted, would limit the usefulness of this Article to informal innovation. The same right
appears in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
art. 15.1(c), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 9.
171. Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, ILO
Conv. 169, June 7, 1989, art. 4, reprinted in ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONVENTIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS: 1919-1991 at 1436 (1992).
172. Id. art. 15.2. The provision was obviously aimed at oil exploration rather than
biological resources, but its language is inclusive:
In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources
or rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall establish or
maintain procedures through which they shall consult these [indigenous] peoples,
with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would be
prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration or
exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands. The peoples concerned shall
wherever possible participate in the benefits of such activities, and shall receive fair
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of such activities.
Id.
173. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Subcommission for the
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess., art. 12,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994) reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 546 [hereinafter Draft Declara-
tion]. The U.N. Human Rights Commission received the Draft Declaration in February 1995
and referred it to a working group to prepare a draft for submission to the General Assembly.
Resolution 1995/32 of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 53rd meeting, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/19951L.1l/Add.2 (1995) reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 535. Negotiations over the Draft
Declaration in the Human Rights Commission are likely to be difficult and protracted.
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including human and other genetic resources, seeds, medicines,
knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, litera-
tures, designs and visual and performing arts. 174
The Draft Declaration raises squarely the question of what kinds of
"special measures" will best serve these goals. Indigenous peoples
themselves, in conjunction with others, have begun to discuss ways to
structure regimes to protect their knowledge and resources that reflect
their priorities, interests, and concerns. The regimes can be grouped into
three options: one, expand the definition of intellectual property rights in
national and international law to include collective innovators and
informal innovations; two, encourage, and impose standards on, private
contracts between communities and corporate or government
"bioprospectors"; or, three, focus more broadly on mechanisms to
promote indigenous and local community rights to use, manage, and
control their local livelihood systems, including both their tangible and
intangible resources. This last, most ambitious, option would privilege
elements of resource control and management over compensation.
A. Expansion of Intellectual Property Rights
One obvious response to the appropriation of indigenous and tradi-
tional knowledge and its fruits is to modify existing national and interna-
tional intellectual property protection regimes to encompass the informal
innovations of indigenous and traditional communities. In general, such
changes would allow for patenting by collective entities, would protect
cumulative or accretive knowledge, and would extend protection to those
innovations involving traditional or nonlaboratory technologies.
Changes in patent law would require, in the first instance, national
legislation. National rules on patents vary widely; however, the comple-
tion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT as well as the Convention on
the Biological Diversity have introduced international constraints. The
TRIPS provisions of GATT 1994 require States to implement patent
systems that utilize the traditional criteria of novelty, nonobviousness,
subject matter, and utility and that extend some form of intellectual
property protection to plant breeders.
75
The nature of such sui generis systems for plant protection is a great
controversy facing many national legislatures. States may, but need not,
174. Draft Declaration, supra note 173, art. 29.
175. TRIPS, supra note 87, art. 27. Several such sui generis systems for plant breeders'
rights exist on a national level; UPOV is one international example of such a system.
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adopt UPOV in either its 1978 or 1991 version in order to comply with
their obligations under TRIPS. 176 While the drafters of TRIPS clearly
intended plant breeders' rights as defined by UPOV to qualify as the sui
generis system adopted, there is no reason why States cannot develop
their own sui generis systems, which could be more friendly to the
claims of indigenous and traditional communities. Some States are mov-
ing to adopt UPOV. 17 7 But in a number of States, including Thailand, the
Philippines, India, and Colombia, coalitions of farmers, indigenous
peoples groups, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have intro-
duced legislative proposals that would enshrine some version of farmers'
rights (Thailand, Colombia) or community rights (India) as alternative
forms of intellectual property protection that recognize communities as
holders of rights to both resources and innovations.7 7 The limit to how
far such sui generis systems can depart from traditional plant breeders'
rights is a function both of the interpretation of the word "effective" in
TRIPS and the dispute resolution machinery of the WTO.
The Convention on Biological Diversity deals with intellectual
property protection in a vague and contradictory manner.179 The Conven-
tion states that, "[i]n the case of technology subject to patents and other
intellectual property rights," access to, and transfer of, that technology
"shall be provided on terms which recognize and are consistent with the
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights."'80
Parties then agree to ensure, through appropriate legislation affecting
both public and private researchers, that those developing countries
providing access to genetic resources will in turn have access to the
biotechnology that uses those resources "on mutually agreed" terms and
"in accordance with international law" - presumably including trade
176. See TRIPS, supra note 87, art. 27.3(b) (requiring at least "an effective sui generis
system").
177. See list in UPOV: Getting a Free TRIPs Ride?, SEEDLING, supra note 114, at 24.
UPOV 1991 is much less favorable to the interests of farmers. Id. 23-25; see also supra note
114. Because that version has not yet come into force, UPOV advocates argue that States
should sign onto UPOV 1978 while it is still valid and thus avoid being pressured to sign onto
the more onerous 1991 version once it comes into force. See UPOV: Getting a Free TRIPs
Ride?, supra note 114, at 24-25.
178. UPOV. Getting a Free TRIPs Ride?, supra note 114, at 28.
179. See, e.g., Abdulqawi Yusuf, Technology and Genetic Resources: Is Mutually-
Beneficial Access Still Possible?, in BIODIPLOMACY, supra note 90, at 237 (provisions of
Article 16 are ambiguous, confusing, and sometimes contradictory); see also Margulies, supra
note 45, at 334-35.
180. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 48, art. 16.2.
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laws.' However, at the same time, the contracting parties are also to
ensure that intellectual property rights are supportive of, and do not run
counter to, the Convention's objectives. 2 Taken in toto, the provisions
leave the protection of industrial intellectual property rights intact and
impose few substantive obligations beyond a commitment not to restrict
access completely to either raw materials or technology.
Proposals seeking to address the concerns of indigenous peoples'
groups and NGOs stress control over compensation.'83 The goal is not
simply to receive money in exchange for access to knowledge and
resources, but to control whether, and how, such knowledge is commer-
cialized, while also leaving it available for noncommercial uses. Thus
several international gatherings of indigenous peoples have demanded
control over their own intellectual property rights.1t 4 Indigenous peoples
181. Id.
182. Article 16.5 reads:
The Contracting Parties, recognizing that patents and other intellectual property
rights may have an influence on the implementation of this Convention, shall
cooperate in this regard subject to national legislation and international law in order
to ensure that such rights are supportive of and do not run counter to its objectives.
Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 48, art. 16.5. This provision may be worthless.
The international law embodied in TRIPS, for example, would not permit a State to deny
patent protection to otherwise patentable materials when that State alleges that such a patent
would harm local or global biodiversity. See TRIPS, supra note 87.
183. Some proposals simply expand existing concepts such as "joint inventorship" to
cover cases where indigenous knowledge leads to patentable drugs or other substances, while
also recognizing that current law fits uneasily with indigenous forms of knowledge. See
generally Huft, supra note 73.
Several authors have proposed expanding and adapting the 1985 UNESCO/WIPO "Model
Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit
Exploitation and other Prejudicial Actions," which recognize both collective and non-written
expressions. See Darrell Addison Posey et al., A Handbook for Indigenous, Traditional, and
Local Communities on Traditional Resource Rights: Protection, Compensation and Conserva-
tion 10 (July 1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Michigan Journal of International
Law). Others have proposed some version of "traditional resource rights" as sui generis
systems providing protection of, and compensation for, both tangible and intangible resources.
Id. at 4.
See also the discussion of defensive publication in THE CRUCIBLE GROUP, supra note 75,
at 78-80. To summarize, U.S. law provides a procedure for publication of inventions such that
any subsequent attempt to patent them can be challenged. These "defensive" schemes could
defeat, for example, the corporate appropriation of communal knowledge. Id. One problem
with such a scheme, however, would be defining and registering the enormous amounts of
knowledge, and the myriad varieties of products of that knowledge, now held by indigenous
and local communities. A similar option is that of inventors' certificates, which provide for
recognition or compensation without monopoly control. See Conserving Indigenous Knowl-
edge, supra note 21, at 32.
184. The Indigenous Peoples' Statement on Access and IPRs, supra note 62, demands
"[flights to control, rights to decide, rights to manage, maintain and benefit from a living
heritage." It further calls for a moratorium on the collection of biological materials until
indigenous and local communities can assert their rights and opposes intellectual property
rights on life forms and processes. I&a
The Charter of the Indigenous-Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests postulates that
"[s]ince we highly value our traditional technologies and believe that our biotechnologies can
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especially demand the ability, through modified intellectual property
schemes, to deny others the ability to commoditize their knowledge. As
one recent report noted, "[t]he first concern of indigenous peoples is their
right NOT to sell, commoditize, or have expropriated from them certain
domains of knowledge and certain sacred places, plants, animals, and
objects."' 5
The emphasis on control raises a fundamental question about the
adoption of modified or expanded intellectual property rights: should
indigenous and traditional people try to modify existing systems to suit
their needs or are such systems irredeemably inappropriate? Both philo-
sophical and practical concerns arise.
On a philosophical level, the concept of private intellectual property
rights is foreign to many indigenous peoples. While some indigenous
knowledge may be restricted or secret, the reasons for the restrictions are
usually not commercial in nature. For some indigenous groups, the
privatization and commoditization of knowledge and of living resources
is both incomprehensible and reprehensible. 86 Indeed, according to Dr.
Darrell Posey, indigenous people "are more concerned about the misuse
or misinterpretation of their knowledge, culture and cultural expres-
sions.' 87 By attempting to manipulate the prevailing Western paradigm
to suit their needs, will indigenous peoples accelerate the very
commodification of knowledge and of living things that many find so
objectionable? Worse, will they be forced to adopt foreign categories as
make important contributions to humanity, including 'developed' countries, we demand
guaranteed rights to our intellectual property, and control over the development and manipula-
tion of this knowledge." Charter of the Indigenous-Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests, art.
44 (Malaysia, 1992) quoted in Marcus Colchester, Some Dilemmas in Asserting Indigenous
Intellectual Property Rights (October 1994) (unpublished document on file with the Michigan
Journal of International Law). Similarly the Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual
Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the result of a 1993 conference convened by indige-
nous groups in New Zealand, demands that the fundamental right of indigenous peoples to
define and control traditional knowledge be protected by the international community. Posey,
supra note 183, at 6.
185. Posey, supra note 183, at 7.
186. Many NGOs similarly reject the idea of patenting living matter on both ethical
grounds and out of a fear of private control over the very building blocks of life. See, e.g,
Patenting Life Forms in Europe, SEEDLING, Mar. 1995, at 4 (noting NGO opposition to recent
European effort to patent living matter). After a debate of many years, the European Parlia-
ment rejected in May 1995 a proposed European Union Directive on Biotechnological
Inventions that would have, among other objectionable items, permitted the patenting of plant,
animal, and human genes. Id. at 4-9 (summarizing debate and veto of the proposed Directive);
see also PATENTING LIFE FORMS IN EUROPE: PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CON-
FERENCE AT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (International Coalition for Development Action
1989) (a conference discussing the Directive).
187. Posey, supra note 183, at 5 (comparing indigenous peoples' views of knowledge
with Western and anthropocentric concepts of intellectual property rights).
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their own, to shoehorn their world views and values into an alien set of
concepts and laws? After all, indigenous peoples have much experience
with the disastrous effects on their communities of imposing Western-
style individual property rights in land.
On the other hand, will refraining from answering pressing demands
for indigenous intellectual property rights merely maintain the status quo
or reify a museum-like vision of unchanging, ahistorical "noble savag-
es?" Some have argued that it is utopian to expect Northern countries to
retreat on imposing ever broader intellectual property protections and that
indigenous and local communities have no choice but to make a foreign
system work for them.
Even if an emphasis on control over access and noncommercializa-
tion, rather than mere compensation, resolves some of these philosophical
issues, practical problems remain. In numerous cases, more than one
community makes similar use of the same resources, sometimes even
using the same processes. In these cases, which community is to receive
the intellectual property rights: the first to invent, the first to file, or any
community showing that they have long used the process or product at
issue? Often, resources taken from local communities find a slightly
different use in developed countries than the traditional use; for example,
endod may be important for killing zebra mussels, not as a soap or fish
intoxicant. How these cases will be resolved remains an open question.
188
Furthermore, the current intellectual property system is heavily
stacked against indigenous and traditional communities, which are over-
whelmingly poor and far from the centers of Northern legal power.
Expanding intellectual property regimes to cover indigenous and tradi-
tional innovation could require communities to challenge patent applica-
tions or to sue for patent infringement in many countries simultaneously
against some of the world's most sophisticated corporations and govern-
ments. Indigenous and traditional communities may end up spending
scarce resources on investigators and attorneys to protect their newly won
intellectual property rights. Even if NGOs representing or aligned with
these groups will do the work, is this the best use of their time and
resources? And does the choice of forum necessarily mean that communi-
ties will be beholden to others, or even to a few of their own, to protect
their interests? Expansion of intellectual property rights under such
188. Under existing patent law, a new use of a known substance is patentable if that use
involves overcoming practical difficulties. See Rohm & Haas v. Roberts Chem. Co., 245 F.2d
693 (4th Cir. 1957); 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 1.03[8] (1978 & Supp. 1995); see also
Odek, supra note 103, at 146 n.29 (discussing European "second use" patents). These "second
use", litent problems might apply to many traditional plants.
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unfavorable conditions may disempower communities, rather than em-
power them. Suggestions for special ombudsmen, tribunals, and financial
support for community legal work might alleviate, but will not eliminate,
some of these problems.'89
B. Private "Bioprospector" Contracts
Interest in biological resources from biotechnology, pharmaceutical,
and other corporations has opened the possibility of direct contractual
relationships between purveyors and buyers of indigenous and traditional
knowledge. Under the typical terms of exchange, a company or research
institute obtains a temporary monopoly over indigenous knowledge or
resources from a delimited area in return for initial and/or royalty pay-
ments. 190
Merck Pharmaceuticals and INBio, a private nonprofit biodiversity
institute created by the Costa Rican government, negotiated one of the
first such contracts. According to what is known about the contract,
Merck provides $1.135 million initially, plus a share of any royalties on
commercial products developed from the accessions,' 9' in exchange for
2,000-10,000 extracts from Costa Rican plants, insects, and microorgan-
isms and Costa Rican screening and research services.1 92 INBio must
contribute a portion of the funds to the Costa Rican government for park
conservation, and Merck must provide technical assistance and training
of Costa Ricans.
193
In December 1993, the United States National Institute of Health
(NIH), Conservation International, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University, and the Missouri Botanical
Garden contracted with the country of Suriname to study medicinal
189. See Conserving Indigenous Knowledge, supra note 21, at 30-32.
190. The International Plant Genetics Resources Institute is developing Materials Transfer
Agreements that would prohibit recipients of germplasm from claiming ownership or intellectu-
al property rights over the germplasm used for breeding, research purposes, or related
information. Genetic Advisory Group Favors Global Germplasm Conservation Plan, [Current
Reports] 18 INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 417 (May 31, 1995); see also THE CRUCIBLE GROUP,
supra note 75, at 70-72.
191. Bioprospecting/Biopiracy and Indigenous Peoples, RAFI COMMUNIQUE (Rural
Advancement Fund. Int'l, Ottawa, Ont.), Nov. 1994, at 3; Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note
101, at 725. The royalty rate is not known because many provisions of the agreement are
secret. However, several commentators estimate it at one to three percent, which roughly equals
the costs of sample collection and extraction as a percentage of total drug discovery cost. Id.
at 726.
192. Walter V. Reid, Biodiversity Prospecting: Strategies for Sharing Benefits, in
BIODIPLOMACY supra, note 90, at 241.
193. Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 101, at 727.
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plants. 4 Under the contract, Bristol-Myers pays royalties to the indige-
nous people of Suriname for drugs derived from local plants' 5 Shamans
and other traditional healers will be eligible to share patent rights to these
compounds. 196
Other initiatives sponsored by the NIH include: an agreement between
Monsanto and the Cayetano Peruvian University to study medicinal plants
from Andean rain forests; one among Walter Reed Army Institute of
Research, the University of Yaounde in Cameroon, and several
U.S.-based conservation groups and pharmaceutical companies to search
for parasitic drugs in the African rainforest; and another involving
American Cyanamid and various universities of Argentina, Chile, Mexico,
and the United States to study medicinal properties of plants from ard
regions.'97 The National Cancer Institute also awards collection contracts
for natural substances. 9 8
One U.S.-based company, Shaman Pharmaceuticals, uses ethno-
botanical science as a drug discovery technique.' 99 It has several patent
claims already pending and has pledged to return a portion of its sales
from drugs derived from community-based knowledge to the communities
involved through its nonprofit arm, the Healing Forest Conservancy.2
However, the company's pharmaceutical industry partner, Eli Lilly, did
not renew its research contract with Shaman in 1994, which caused the
company to lay off staff and downsize its screening programs and raised
doubts about the feasibility of this approach given the demands of venture
capitalists for short-term returns.2°'
Scholars, activists, and indigenous peoples' representatives disagree
on the potential of such private contracts. On the one hand, contracts have
the advantage of allowing indigenous and local communities to bypass
the State, albeit within a State regulatory framework, and negotiate on
194. Rick Weiss, Scientists Try to Turn Weeds into Wonder Drugs, WASHINGTON POST,




198. Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 101, at 721. The Letter of Collection stipulates that
"permission of the traditional healer or community will be sought before publication of their
[sic] information, and proper acknowledgment will be made of their [sic] contribution." Id. at
722. No provision exists, however, for the sharing of any financial rewards from the informa-
tion. See id.
199. Rubin & Fish, supra note 50, at 30 (citing David Riggle, Pharmaceuticals From the
Rainforest, IN BUSINESS, Feb. 1992, at 26).
200. Id.
201. Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 101, at 733-34.
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their own behalf. The benefits of any such arrangements may go directly
to the local community, not the State treasury. Contracts also decentralize
controls over the use of resources and offer flexibility in the ability to
designate individual or collective owners of different kinds of knowledge
and to tailor provisions to a given situation. Moreover, parties to a
contract may stipulate to protective conditions. 2
Skeptics point to several potential problems with private contracts,
even those regulated by codes of conduct or including protective provi-
sions. First, of course, the two parties to the deal have vastly different
resources, abilities to bargain, and abilities to enforce the provisions of
any agreement. One proposed answer is to stipulate an initial escrow
fund, paid by the buyer, to cover the legal fees of the community in any
case of dispute. Yet the question is not simply one of money, but also of
access to information: for example, information about the potential
commercial value of a certain product. A network of advisors and the
training of indigenous and local people themselves would ameliorate the
problem, but in any case the community would still lose direct control
over a portion of its resource base. Of the possible options, bilateral
contracts provide, in practice, the least opportunity for control over
access; the whole point is facilitating access in exchange for compensa-
tion and so any controls on access limit the attractiveness of the deal.
In addition, contracts may exacerbate divisions among indigenous and
local communities as parts of the community seek to capitalize on
lucrative opportunities to the exclusion of others.2°3 Often the same plant
or microorganism is found in several different communities that span
national borders; corporations and scientists could therefore play one
community against another for the most favorable terms.
202. Such provisions might include patent protection of indigenous knowledge, adequate
documentation of the origin of the knowledge, creation of a legal fund and/or ombudsman to
assist indigenous or local communities in the necessary legal arrangements, training of local
people in collection and processing of specimens, joint planning, and some type of liability for
infringements of the patent. See Rubin & Fish, supra note 50, at 47-48; Conserving Indigenous
Knowledge, supra note 21, at 30-31. Third World Network has developed model provisions
for bioprospecting contracts. See Community Intellectual Rights Act, reprinted in Singh Nijar,
supra note 14. The FAO has also developed a voluntary International Code of Conduct for
Plant Germplasm Collecting and Transfer, FAO Resolution 8/93, in REPORT OF THE CONFER-
ENCE OF FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 27th Sess., 113,
U.N. Doc 93/REP (1993). The Traditional Resource Rights group has also developed a model
Covenant including provisions for indigenous groups to decline commercialization of some
knowledge, to keep information confidential, and to require independent monitoring of
agreements. See Posey, supra note 183, at 19-21.
203. See Jack Kloppenburg, Jr., W(h)ither Farmers' Rights? (Oct. 7, 1994) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law) for a discussion of the
drawbacks of bilateral approaches. See also Bioprospecting/Biopiracy and Indigenous Peoples,
supra note 193, at 3.
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Contracts may also limit community control over the amount and
distribution of whatever benefits accrue. For example, Shaman
Pharmaceuticals does not plan to return royalties directly to source
communities but to a Northern-run NGO that will distribute the proceeds
as it sees fit. In a recent consortium deal, Searle Pharmaceutical
(Monsanto) agreed to pay $15,000 per year "for the benefit of local
inhabitants of the Collection Area," but the money will be paid to, and
distributed by, Washington University, an institution located in the United
States. Any royalty payments, ranging from two-tenths of a percent to
one percent of any licensed product, will also be distributed through
Washington University after deducting costs for research, development,
and management by the Northern scientific institutions involved. The
amount of money that actually reaches indigenous communities under
these terms may be much less than expected, amounting to little more
than the employment of local people as cheap labor in the collection
process. And Northern environmental NGOs and research institutes, not
indigenous communities, may control the use of any funds that do
materialize. Moreover, so long as communities in Southern countries
continue to act as mere providers of raw materials for processing else-
where, they forfeit the value-adding possibilities of in-country processing
of such materials and reproduce the cycles of dependency that have
characterized South-North relationships since colonial times.
C. Multilateral Agreements and Funds
Given the drawbacks of private frameworks, the best option may be
a public, multilateral set of agreements among States and communities
governing access to indigenous and local knowledge and its products.
Such agreements could cover at least the majority of cases where it is
impossible to associate a certain material or technique with a unique
ethnic or geographic group, as well as cover those resources already
collected and held in ex situ collections where the exact provenance is un-
known.
204
The most frequently discussed multilateral framework would incor-
porate a revised FAO Undertaking either as a separate binding treaty or
204. Often the documentation of materials collected in gene banks is incomplete.
PLUNKNETT ET AL., supra note 131, at 187. To account for this reality, Kathleen Yurchak has
advocated a three-tier scheme involving an expanded definition of patents to cover community-
specific medicinal or similar knowledge, modified plant breeders' rights for agricultural
innovation, and a residual "national resource" licensing regime. Kathleen Yurchak, IPRs for
LDCs under the GATT's TRIPs Code: Alphabet Soup or Community Empowerment? 3 (Spring
1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law).
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as a protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity.2 5 The most
promising part of the current Undertaking is its reference to farmers'
rights, which could be redefined to provide for participation of indigenous
and local communities in the control and compensation of genetic
knowledge. Direct participation of indigenous and local communities is
not now part of the Undertaking: farmers' rights are vested in the inter-
national community as trustee.2° FAO officials, moreover, have tended
to equate farmers' rights with the rights of sovereign States.2 °7 The
Leipzig Declaration on Conservation and Sustainable Utilization of Plant
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, the most recent intergov-
ernmental statement on the issue, recognizes the desirability of fairly and
equitably sharing benefits arising from the use of knowledge, innovations,
and practices developed by generations of men and women farmers, plant
breeders, and indigenous and local communities, but stops far short of
implementing farmers' rights.20 8
Similarly, the Undertaking fund currently set up to compensate
farmers for their past, present, and future contributions is both inoperative
and functionally State-centered. Any replacement fund would have to be
mandatory and include participatory mechanisms in order for funds to
reach communities directly. The main drawback to a fund is the declining
ability and willingness of resource-using Northern countries to contribute
to international funds and organizations; the Leipzig conference only
confirmed that any attempt to secure "new and additional funds" will
meet with strong opposition.2 9 Perhaps mechanisms for directly taxing
205. See, e.g., Kloppenburg, supra note 203, at 7-12. Another central element of many
proposals for multilateral proposals is the elaboration of the Prior Informed Consent (PIC)
procedure envisioned in Article 15.5 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, whereby com-
munities and/or governments would have to consent to the removal of genetic resources from
their territory and could, therefore, impose conditions on any removal. See Convention on
Biological Diversity, supra note 48, art. 15.5. For a discussion of a PIC model applied to
genetic resources, see Frederic Hendricks et al., Access to Genetic Resources: A Legal Analysis,
in BIODIPLOMACY, supra note 90, at 139, 142.
206. See discussion supra note 165.
207. See Kloppenburg, supra note 203, at 7-8.
208. Leipzig Declaration on Conservation and Sustainable Utilization of Plant Genetic
Resources for Food And Agriculture, Fourth International Technical Conference on Plant
Genetic Resources, Leipzig, Germany, June 17-23, 1996, paras. 1, 4, reproduced at
<http://web.icppgr.fao.orgtitcpgr/96.6/96.6html>. The Declaration and the Global Plan of Action
on Plant Genetic Resources did contain some promising language on the need for in situ and
on-farm conservation and for programs to stimulate farmers to grow landraces, obsolete, and
traditional varieties. See International Institute on Sustainable Development, No. 47 Summary
of the Fourth International Conference on Plant Genetic Resources at <http://www.iisd.ca/
linkages/vol09/094700e.html>. However, the United States especially opposed any concrete
steps towards implementing farmers' rights, although Latin American, Asian, and African
nations strongly supported them in some form. Id.
209. Delegates to the Global Plan of Action on Plant Genetic Resources, adopted in June
1996 at the Leipzig Conference, were unable to agree on appropriate language on funding. See
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the users of genetic materials - pharmaceutical, agrochemical, seed, and
the like industries - would have more success. Such a tax would be both
compensatory and a precondition of continued access to resources and
knowledge.
CONCLUSION
Any of these three options presents drawbacks as well as advantages,
and the emerging regime may combine a number of modalities. In any
event, developments in biotechnology may make the need for germplasm
from Southern countries and communities merely a temporary phenome-
non. If such resources do not prove as lucrative as they once appeared,
any incentive for Northern corporations and governments to renegotiate
the terms of access to them may dissipate. Under these conditions, the
fight against appropriation will be limited to seeking compensation for
past uses, a far more problematic exercise in the absence of continuing
incentives.
Second, mechanisms for structuring community control over access
to resources may founder on the elusive definitions of who speaks for the
community. Communities are usually not homogeneous, harmonic entities
but include "formal and informal power structures" reflecting "social,
economic, and political relationships among the members of the commu-
nity as well as with the outside world. '210 Mechanisms for resolving
disputes over ownership of knowledge and resources within each commu-
nity would have to evolve simultaneously with any viable system of local
control over resources. Moreover, often it is not clear that the knowledge
or resources at issue originated in any single community. Especially
problematic are cases where a similar technique or variety exists in
several different areas. Some system of self-declaration or registration of
communities wishing to protect their innovations, combined with a
mechanism for resolving conflicts and sharing benefits among different
communities claiming ownership of the same knowledge, might be
required to manage these problems.21' Where multiple ownership is
claimed, a fund approach might become more workable.
Fourth International Technical Conference on Plant Genetic Resources, Leipzig, Germany, June
17-23, 1996 at <http://web.icppgr.fao.org/ITCPGR/Leipzig.html>. They agreed to postpone
discussion of funding options until the December 1996 meeting of the FAO to revise the
Undertaking. Id.
210. STAN BURKEY, PEOPLE FIRST: A GUIDE TO SELF-RELIANT, PARTICIPATORY RURAL
DEVELOPMENT 207 (1993).
211. I am indebted to Kathleen Yurchak for this idea. Of course, these problems might
make a trust idea more attractive, in that it would tie benefits less directly to a showing that
the particular community was the sole source of any particular knowledge or resource.
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Under any regime, three issues will be key: defining and ensuring the
participation of different kinds of indigenous, traditional, and local
communities; recognizing the multiple roles such communities play; and
framing solutions that link the issues of appropriation of knowledge and
resources to the larger agenda of community protection and development.
Some communities are easier to define than others. Indigenous
peoples, while often divided along gender, power, or philosophical lines,
are relatively well-defined internationally, and their existence as distinct
groups, if not as peoples, is finally becoming more accepted. 12 Their
demand for intellectual property rights is part of a larger fight for control
over their land and resources and for self-determination. Indigenous
peoples now have an effective and growing network of local, national, re-
gional, and global organizations able to represent them.
This is not true of local communities. Local communities overlap
somewhat with indigenous peoples; indeed, one possible explanation of
the introduction of the term "local" into official international discourse is
simply that it avoids endless debates over which people qualify as
"indigenous" or "tribal." The term is broad enough to include subsistence
farmers or those who produce for regional markets, in-shore fisherpeople,
nomadic herders, hunter-gatherers, forest peoples, artisan communities, or
others who derive a large part of their livelihood from the natural world.
These communities, long the stewards of local biodiversity, often exist
precariously on the edge of, and are threatened by, the industrialized,
high-input systems of agribusiness, long-distance factory trawler fishing,
large-scale cattle-ranching, and mass tourism. Although many such
communities have some type of local organization, for example, a peasant
or farmers' league or a development association, few have an effective
political voice at the national or international level. While some are
closely bound by ties of ancestry, language, or other cultural characteris-
tics, others share no bond other than their use of, and dependence on,
natural resources for a livelihood, their relative remove from the centers
of power, and some sense of themselves as a community, although not by
any means a united or homogeneous one.
How are local communities to be adequately defined and represented
for purposes of controlling, and receiving the benefits of, their knowledge
and resources within either a national or multilateral framework? Some
212. A common definition includes elements of shared control of territory or resources,
self-definition as a member of the group, nondominant status within the larger society,
continuous governing structures, and, perhaps, continuity with pre-colonial societies. See
generally J. Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, reissued as U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/19867 and Adds. 1-4.
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general characteristics of such communities - a natural resource base, a
form of social organization, and a sense of membership - may serve as
guideposts.2 3 Beyond that, both the similarities of local communities with
indigenous peoples, and the very important legal differences between
them, will need recognition to ensure that the linguistic union of the two
groups in international discourse leads to alliances and not competition.
Effective mechanisms to allow for community participation and control
over decisionmaking, especially by the poorest sectors of the community,
who may be most closely tied to the preservation of resources, will be
key. In this regard, the use of arguments against appropriation for the
purpose of reallocating resources from transnational corporations and
Northern governments and institutions to Southern elites - bypassing the
landless farmers, fishers, artisans, and other poor yet again - is a real
danger.
An end to appropriation requires recognition of the role of indigenous
and local communities as stewards of scientific and ecological knowledge
and resources, as innovators of that knowledge and the associated re-
sources, and as practitioners of sustainable production and life systems.
2 '4
For these communities, the right to control their scientific knowledge and
the associated resources is inseparable from rights to the communities'
communal heritage, including its tangible and intangible elements.
Heritage rights may encompass land and resource rights, secure land
tenure, measures to defend local artisanry and agriculture from the
destructive effects of global commerce, and, in the case of indigenous
peoples, more broadly defined rights to self-determination.
In the long run, the ability of indigenous, traditional, and local
peoples to obtain a say in the use of their knowledge and the products of
that knowledge will depend on the vibrancy, visibility, and agency of
those communities. Ending the appropriation of this knowledge is only
one part of a larger agenda of community empowerment.
213. Gurdial Singh Nijar of Third World Network suggests as a working definition "a
group of people having a longstanding social organization that binds them together whether in
a defined area or howsoever otherwise." Singh Nijar, supra note 14, at 6. This definition would
include both indigenous peoples and local farming communities.
214. See Genetic Resources Action International, Framework for Full Articulation of
Farmers' Rights 2.1 (June 1995) (unpublished document on file with the Michigan Journal
of International Law).
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